DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF GHANA by SANTI, EMANUELE
UNIVERSITA' DEGLI STUDI DI TRIESTE 
Sede Amministrativa del Dottorato di Ricerca 
UNIVERSITA' DEGLI STUDI 
DI NAPOLI, DI P ARIS-SORBONNE, DEL PIEMONTE ORIENTALE, 
DI SALERNO, DEL SANNIO, DI SASSARI, 
Sedi Convenzionate 
XVII CICLO DEL DOTTORATO DI RICERCA 
IN POLITICHE DI SVILUPPO E GESTIONE DEL TERRITORIO 
DECENTRALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
THE CASE OF GHANA 
DOTTORANDO 
Dott. SANTI EMANUELE ''f c 
COORDINATORE DEL COLLEGIO DEI DOCENTI 
Chiar. ma Prof. ssa MARIA PAOLA PAGNINI- UNIV. DI TRIESTE 
u1 lL y1i ~· 
RELATORE E TUTORE 
Chiar. ma Prof. ssa MARIA PAOLA PAGNINI - UNIV. DI TRIESTE 
l,U, lU ~iw 
ANNO ACCADEMICO 2003-2004 
Decentralization and Governance in Developing Countries: The Case o/Ghana 2 
" ... govemments and citizens cando better. How? By putting poor 
people at the centre of service provision: by enabling them to 
monitor and discipline service providers, by amplifying their voice 
in policymaking, and by strengthening the incentives for providers 
to serve the poor. .. " 
2004 World Development Report 
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INTRODUCTION 
The world has experienced several "waves" of new thinking and strategies for 
economie development. Economists and political scientists have often embraced 
the temptation of finding a single, globally applicable, and often standardized 
solution to welfare increase. Tue developing countries in particular have 
witnessed, more or less actively, the rise and fall of new "development 
paradigms". In many cases they have fallen in step and adopted the newest global 
recipe for poverty reduction, often under the pressure of donors or intemational 
organization. If the 70s and 80s are known in the history of development as the 
decades of privatization and structural adjustment, the 90s and the current decade 
would probably be labeled as the times of decentralization and locai development 
However, the concept of decentralization is probably more appealing nowadays 
than the previous paradigms. This is probably due in large part to its linkages with 
broadly accepted ideas of democracy and community development, but also 
because it has grown in a different context that is far from the world of huge 
macroeconomie shocks that led up to the rise of massive privatizations and the 
structural adjustments. 
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Decentralization has therefore become a very popular keyword these days, and as 
Paul Faguet pointed out, "reformers and idealists have tumed to decentralization 
as an antidote to ills as varied as govemmental corruption, autocracy and 
repressi on, and public-sector inefficiency"2• 
Similar to the debate on privatization in the past decades, the discussion on this 
new "panacea" is somehow confusing and a victim of ideological bias. At the 
same time, it is also rooted in specific experiences of success or failure. 
This work is an attempt to capture the key elements of this debate, while 
combining the geo-politica} analysis with the investigation of key govemance 
issues. First, the geographer' s lenses and territorial approach lead us to view 
decentralization in a locai perspective and highlight the differences in what may 
happen in a rural village in Ghana as opposed to the capitai of a Western 
European country. It also helps highlight the internal territorial premises for 
decentralization, such as the regional inequality. This approach is coupled with 
the govemance framework, which looks at the political economy of the 
decentralization process from a broader perspective, and focuses on the way 
stakeholders' dialogues and participation takes piace .. 
2 
Faguet, J. P: Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to locai Needs? Evidence from 
Bolivia, Policy Research Working Paper 2516, World Bank, Washington D.C. 200 I, (p.1 ). 
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lndeed, tbe analysis of tbe links between governance and decentralization in a 
specific geographic context is not new. As Rosembaum points out, the work of 
Jean-Jacque Rousseau and bis observations on the functioning of Swiss Cantons 
already suggested a close relation between democracy, govemance and 
decentralization3• Along tbese lines, Alexis de Tocqueville, in bis assessment of 
tbe newly formed system of tbe United States, stressed the significance of locai 
govemments and civil society for the development and preservation of democratic 
institutions. Tbe importance attributed to tbe locai governance and to tbe 
decentralized administrative system is not limited to Western tradition. In fact, in 
a variety of traditional societies, from Africa to Latin America, the originai 
development framework relied beavily on locai structures. 
Drawing from tbese premises, the analysis of the latest literature on the topi e, and 
the wealth of the documented experiences of decentralization in developing 
countries, the work focuses on the case of Ghana, a country where the 
decentralization issue has received a broad recognition, but also a showcase of tbe 
struggles implicit in most decentralization processes in the developing countries. 
In terms of methodology, tbe work is a result of a mix of research tools and 
metbods, comprising a review of existing wide literature on the topic, interviews 
witb selected experts and civil servants involved in decentralization processes, 
3 
Rosembaum, A.: "Gouvemance et Décentralisation: Leçons de l 'Expérience", Revue française 
d'administration publique, n. 88, octobre - décembre, ENA Paris, 1998, (p. 507-516). 
Decentralization and Governance in Developing Countries: The Case o/Ghana 13 
and personal observations. The latter was done through several trips to the rural 
areas and fieldwork, especially in the Northem regions. While the literature on the 
broader debate on decentralization is certainly abundant, comprehensive analyses 
of the specific case of Ghana are relatively scarce. This adds to the lack of cross-
national data, making a comparative analysis fairly troublesome. Although there 
are some good independent reviews of the Ghanaian experience, the main sources 
of information on the country have been publications by the govemment and by 
some intemational organizations, such as the World Bank. The possible bias 
towards specific policy options by these sources warranted a cautious approach 
and interpretation by the author. 
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1. THE STATE BETWEEN GLOBALIZATION AND 
LOCALISMS 
1.1. Globalization and the new rote of the State 
14 
In the last couple of decades, the globalization, intended as "the process of 
increased interdependence and linkages between different economies, societies 
and cultures of the world"4, has brought significant changes in social, economie, 
cultural and political landscapes of most countries in the world. Although some 
authors5 may argue that globalization is nothing new or it is stili an incomplete 
process, it is currently changing the landscape and the "rules of the game" for 
nation states and intemational organizations6 • 
The large changes of transnational dimensions to the world economie activities, 
the transformation of the ways in which the intemational trarle is currently 
organized and the flow of concepts and new cultural sensitivities shared across the 
4 Hodder, R.: Geografia dello Sviluppo, Istituto Geografico De Agostini, Novara, 2001, (p. 159). 
5 Cohen, S.: "Corporate Nationality Can Matter a Lot", Testimony before VS Congress Joint 
Economie Committee, September, 1990. 
6 
Rondinelli, D. and G. S. Cheema: Reinventing Governmentfor the Twenty-First Century, 
Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, 2003, (p. l ). 
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globe, are leading in particular to a review of the traditional role of the state as a 
centrai planner of the economy, as the main provider of goods and services, as 
well as the engine of growth. Some observers even argue that the ability of a State 
to exercise contrai and govem within its own boundaries, as well as run 
transactions occurring across its national borders, are facing larger limitations by 
the global economy 7• Nevertheless, Hodder8 argues that globalization does not 
bring the reduction or the disappearance of the importance of the geographic 
context, nor the end of the State, as argued by Rondine Ili and Cheema9 • 
In this sense, the nation state is called to reshape its approach and its functions 10 
toward national stakeholders, as well as focusing on creating an enabling 
environment for national and sub-national competitiveness, as on of its priority. 
On the need to reshape its approach, there is quite a consensus that globalization 
is bringing to a broader recognition to other actors, but at national and 
intemational level as key partners for development. As Olowu points out, this new 
redefinition lead to defy the traditional concept of govemment, characterized by 
the domination of the State over the society and of the centrai executive branch 
over the other State institutions, such as the Parliament, the judiciary system, the 
7 Idem. 
8 Hodder, R.: 2001, Op. Cit. 
9 Rondinelli, D. and G. S. Cheema: 2003, Op. Cit. 
10 
The functional approach to politica} geography and authors like Richard Hartshome see the 
State as a politically organized space, which operates with effectiveness. In this regard, the State 
would be "a more functional organization than the feudal or tribal localisms that preceded its 
creati on" using the words of Karl Deutch in his work on the models of integrati on. In this sense 
centripeta} forces would be justified if they lead to a more functional organization (Glassner, M.: 
Manuale di Geografia Politica, Voi I, Francoangeli, Milano, 1995, (p. 120). 
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public compames, as well as the locai govemments 11 • "The democratization 
opens the door to a new polycentric concept of State, which values the diversity of 
national and locai forces, encompassing the public, private, non-govemmental and 
community's interests."12 
In terms of its main objectives, as mentioned earlier, the State is now cali ed to be 
an enabler and a facilitator for development. As pointed out by the World Bank 
World Development Report of 1997, intentionally tiled "The State in a Changing 
World," "development requires an effective state, one that encourages and 
complements the activities of private businesses and individuals. An effective 
state is vital for the provision of the goods and services--.and rules and 
institutions--that allow markets to flourish and people to lead healthier, happier 
lives. Without it, sustainable development, both economie and socia!, is 
impossible. Experience shows that the state stili plays a centrai role to economie 
and social development, as a partner, catalyst and facilitator, rather than a direct 
provider of growth" 13 • 
In this sense decentralization can be a key factor to a better efficiency for service 
delivery and physical infrastructure, which in tum facilitate competitiveness. 
Rondinelli, argues "highly centralized govemments may in fact be less effective 
11 Olowu, D. : "Evaluation des Politiques de Décentralisation en Afrique Dans les Années Quatre-
Vingt-Dix", Revuefrançaise d'administration publique, n. 88, octobre - décembre 1998, ENA 
Paris, (p. 517-528). 
12 Idem. 
13 World Bank: World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1997. 
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in creating a conducive business environment that govemments that are more 
decentralized and able to respond quickly to changes in locai needs and 
conditions"14• Particularly in Africa, as we would see in the following chapters 
and case studi es, it is impossible to de-link the decentralization process of the 90s 
from the broader redefinition of the role of the State. 
A clear example of a synthesis between the two above elements, the partnership 
with other non-State actors and the search far a localize solution to service 
delivery, can be found in the concepts and realities of the so-called industriai 
districts or the milieux of innovation, where the locati on focus and the govemment 
responsiveness to the locai characteristics is of decisive importance. In fact, one 
may argue, following Castells' words15, that "globalization stimulates 
regionalization" 16• This point is supported, according to the same author, by 
several examples and studies, such as the European regions in the l 990s, where 
the growing intemationalization of economie activities have led these regions to 
be more dependent on these activities and to restructure in order to compete in the 
global economy. Some of these have also established networks of cooperation 
between regional institutions and companies based in the region, often based on 
14 Rondinelli, D. and G. S. Cheema: 2003, Op. Cit. (pag 50). 
15 Castells, M.: The Rise ofthe Network Society, Blackwell Publisher, Oxford, 2000, (p. 381). 
16 The concept ofregion finds an interesting treatment by Ferrando Badia and his theory ofthe 
Regional State (Glassner, M.:1995, Op. Cit.), a Unitary State granting large autonomy to its 
regions, especially ifthey are characterized by a certain ethnic or physical "distance" from the 
centrai nucleus. A typical example ofregional State can be Italy, where the autonomy of certain 
regions such as Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino-Alto Adige, ValJe d'Aosta and Friuli-Venezia Giulia, are 
certainly based on particular historic, geographic and cultural differences and go beyond much of 
the conventional delegation ofpower. 
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product specializations. Example of this so-called "new industriai space" are 
abundant, and comprise centers of information-technology like the Silicon Valley 
in the US, the Western Midlands shoe district in England and some of the many 
smaller industriai districts in North-East Italy. 
These districts bave definitively seen a major role of the locai administration as a 
catalyst for development and as leader for the creation of spaces of dialogue and 
collaboration between key actors, like specialized companies and research centers 
17
• It is also worth noting how the development policy of the European Union in 
the recent years has indeed focused on the regions, creating a new geography and 
categorization, as well a set of specialized support programs for each group of 
regions across the member countries. This definitively testified the recent 
developments have not only created a new geography based on regions facing a 
global competition, and it leads to a rethinking of development policies towards a 
greater recognition of locai specificities. 
1.2. From government to governance 
As globalization has been leading force to a redefinition of the role of the state, its 
relation with the citizens, and generally with non-govemmental stakeholders, has 
also changed dramatically across the globe. This has led to the development of 
17 Ibidem: p. 384-392. 
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new concepts and theories, as an attempt to capture and explain the new 
complexity of the goveming process. One of these concepts is the so-called 
govemance. 
The term 'govemance' has its origins in the field of intemational relations and of 
comparative politics 18• Kooman defined govemance as "the process of goveming, 
which is no longer conducted exclusively by the state, but involves 'all those 
activities of social, politica! and administrative actors that guide, steer, control or 
manage the society" 19• The term also considers that the relationship between state 
and non-state actors (such as environmental NGOs, economie actors, quasi-
govemmental agencies) are non-hierarchical, and based on mutuai dependence20 
This results in a growing recognition of the inter-dependencies that exist between 
state and society, between the public and the private. In short, as the new mode of 
govemance develops, society, the economie and the politica! system cease to be 
run, as it were, from the 'top-down' by govemments engaged in the traditional 
business of goveming21 
18 See: Rosenau, J.N and E. O. Czempiel, eds.: Govemance without Govemment: Order and 
Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. 
19 Kooiman, J.: "Govemance and Govemability: Using Complexity, Dynamics and Diversity", 
Kooiman ed., Modem Govemance: New Govemment-Society lnteractions, London: Sage, 1993, 
(p. 2). 
20 Jachtenfuchs, M.: Democracy and Govemance in the European Union", European lntegration 
On-Line Papers, 1997. 
21 Baker, S.: "The lmpact ofEastem Enlargement on EU Environmental Governance", Paper 
presented at the Environmental Studies Workshop, 'Environmental Challenges of EU Eastern 
Enlargemenf', Robert Schuman Centre, EUI, Florence, 25-26 June 2001, (p. 2). 
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Citizens and civil society are therefore demanding more participation in the 
decision-making process of public policies, as well as on their implementation 
and follow-ups. The role that non-state actors have in Govemance can be easily 
understood by a more technical definition of govemance as "(i) the process by 
which govemments are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the 
govemment to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (iii) the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govem eco!lomic and 
social interactions among them"22• 
One key aspect of the concept of govemance is that it looks beyond technical 
solution to policy making, but rather focuses on the interaction of stakeholders on 
a political agenda. For this reasons, many govemance measurements rely heavily 
on subjective perceptions by locai stakeholders. The World Bank Institute 
methodology for assessing the quality of govemance is for instance based on polis 
of experts and cross-country surveys of residents23• 
1.3. The role of public communication for good governance 
Due to the importance that the govemance concepts gives to stakeholders and 
interactions, one of its key element in these interaction is the way communication 
22 
Kaufinan, D. et al.: "Govemance Matters", Policy Research Working Paper, 2196, World Bank 
, Washington D.C., 1999. 
23 Idem. 
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flows occur among these actors. This is particularly important when a change or 
more specifically a policy reform takes piace. In his review of economie reform 
program undertaken in Venezuela in the early 1990s, for instance, Moises Naim 
argues that "major reforms create an information vacuum: the population needs to 
know what is happening and why, and what the consequences of the changes will 
be for daily life and future security"24• At the same time they must correct 
distortions and misinformation created and promulgated by opposing interests. 
However, as Naim notes, the public communication techniques govemments have 
tended to use to promote their policies do not adeguate to the task of building 
popular support for substantial policy changes. Y et, without clear communication 
of the reform agenda-its purpose and its effect on people's daily lives and well-
being-via credible leaders, the mass media, and innovative public information 
programs, a govemment is not likely to win the public support for the new 
policies25• 
The role of public communication in the new context however, goes beyond the 
persuasion of possible opponents and the simple building of public support to a 
reform designed in a top-down fashion. In a situation where non-state 
stakeholders have a greater influence into policymaking, communication plays a 
vital role in fostering dialogue and mutuai understanding among actors on policy 
changes and stimulates the demand for change. Stakeholders are therefore enabled 
24Naim, M.: Paper Tigers and Minotaurs: The Politics of Venezuela 's Reforms, The Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C, 1999. 
25 Idem. 
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to get to know each other, discuss challenges and perspectives, identify problems 
and needs, agree to new objectives and roles, make transitions towards these ends, 
be kept up-to-date on progress and problems, and correct course when needed. 
These tasks depend critically on awareness, trust, coordination and mechanisms 
for dialogue26• 
Especially, on the topic of decentralization reforms, we can conclude, as the 
World Bank does, that "citizens should have channels to communicate their 
preferences and get their voices heard in locai govemments. However, the mere 
existence of such means is not enough. In order to effectively pressure public 
policies and watch over locai govemments, the public needs to have adequate 
information about the policies and the activities oftheir own government27• 
In a review conducted by the University of Maryland on the decentralization of 
health and educati on sector in Uganda and Philippines, limited informati on on 
locai politics and events is proven to be one of the largest constraints for the 
effectiveness of these reforms. Citizens in both countries declared to be less 
informed about locai govemment than national govemment. While citizens in 
both countries rely on the media for information about national politics and 
corruption, they rely largely on community leaders and locai officials and 
26 
Santi E. and L. Grenna,: "Environmental Communications Assessment: A framework of 
analysis for the environmental governance", Paper presented at the 7Th Biennial Conference on 
Communication and the Environment, Oregon, COCE 2003. 
27 
World Bank: "Decentralization and govemance: does decentralization improve public service 
delivery?," PREM notes, 55, Washington D.C., June 2001. 
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personal contacts (in the Philippines) for such information at the locai level (in 
Uganda)28• 
Tue media can therefore play a crucial role in this area, not only by disseminating 
govemment information, freeing locai communities from the dependence on locai 
elites for the search of information, but also promoting good govemance and 
reduce corruption. This contributi on is not only the result of the awareness media 
can create on corruption, its causes, consequences and remedies, but, on a larger 
extent, of the investigative role joumalists bave on assessing and reporting the 
prevalence of corruption. The efficacy of the media in this sense is therefore 
largely dependent on the access of information and the freedom of expression29• 
As shown in the following figure, as there is a clear negative correlation between 
the freedom of the media and corruption, as countries with freer media tend to 
score better (lower index) in terms of corruption. 
28 Idem. 
29 Stapenhurst, R.: Le Raie des Médias dans la Lutte contre la Corruption, World Bank Institute, 
Washington, D. C., 2004. 
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Figure 1 Corruption and freedom of the media (correlation - 0,69) 
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Particularly at locai level, media can play a crucial role in stimulating socia! 
demands by locai actors and empower people. Community radios, in particular, 
are very effective in giving voice to the powerless and promote debate on locai 
development. In the World Bank funded Locai Development Project in Ecuador 
for instance, community radios have proved to be a means through which 
community groups are empowered to voice their views, become engaged and 
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identify tbeir priorities in locai initiatives tbat complement decentralized locai 
development programs30• 
One furtber key aspect of communication is its use as a set of tools for analysis of 
tbe eff ectiveness of certain reforms. Day and Monroe encompass tbese tools 
under tbe concept of formative researcb, wbicb tbey define as "any researcb tbat 
belps define tbe content of an intervention. It may be eitber primary or secondary 
researcb, and can be qualitative or quantitative31 • Often, secondary researcb is 
undertaken first to find out wbat previous initiative otbers bave done about tbe 
same issue and try to understand tbe barriers tbey encountered. Once that step is 
completed, primary research, strengthened by adding tbe results of earlier efforts, 
may be conducted"32• 
In particular, tbe formative researcb on communication is stakeholders oriented 
and tries to capture a pbenomenon or a public interventi on through tbe eyes of the 
actors wbicb bave an interest into it. For this reason it uses a variety of methods, 
ranging from in-deptb consultation to opinion researcb, as well as specific media 
analysis. Tbese analyses would provide more precise information and baseline 
data on opinion, believes and practices whicb can be used to help setting specific 
30 Pichon F., E. Santi, et al.: "Empowerment through Communication: The case ofCommunity 
Radios in Ecuador", En Breve, No 54, World Bank, Washington D.C., 2004. 
31 Day. B., and C. M., Monroe, eds.: Environmental Education and Communicationfor a 
Sustainable World, a Handbook for Practitioners, Academy for Educational Development, 
Washington D.C., 2000. 
32 Ibidem: p. 4 7 
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targets, monitor and evaluate the a public policy intervention as well as devising a 
specific communications strategy supporting it33 • 
As presented in the following chapter, communication analysis is proven to be a 
useful tool in evaluating the effectiveness of a decentralization program, as well 
as being a key element of its govemance. 
33 Santi E. and L. Grenna.: 2003, Op. Cit. 
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2. DECENTRALIZATION IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
2.1. Definitions of decentralization 
27 
The word "decentralization" is frequently used to refer to many different 
processes ranging from administrative deconcentration of some executive 
agencies to privatization of tasks performed by centrai public agencies to the 
private sector. Decentralization can be therefore defined broadly as "the transfer 
of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising and allocation 
from the centrai govemment and its agencies to: (i) fields units of centrai 
govemment ministries or agencies, (ii) subordinate units or levels of government, 
(iii) semiautonomous public authorities or corporations, (iv) areawide, regional or 
functional authorities, or (v) nongovernmental private or voluntary 
organizations"34• 
Decentralization can vary a lot in terms of its scope. This is definitively a function 
of amount of responsibility and discretion in policy-making, which is granted 
from the centrai govemment to the above-mentioned agents. There is also a 
geopolitica} dimension, linked to the choice of both the physical and politica} 
34 Rondinelli , D. et al.: Decentralization in Developing countries. Staff Working Paper 582, 
World Bank, Washington D.C., 1983, (p. 9). 
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distance of the unit, and type of territorial Unit chosen for a certain decentralized 
competence (e.g. Region, Province and Municipality)35 • These Units are often 
linked to an earth's surfaces with characteristics, either natural or man-made, that 
make it different from areas that surround it36. Using Hope's words, 
"decentralization can be either horizontal or vertical. Horizontal decentralization 
disperses power among institutions at the same Ievel, while vertical 
decentralization allows some of the powers of a centrai govemment to be 
delegated downwards to lower tiers of authority"37• In both cases, the 
decentralization framework "argues for the assignment of a responsibility to the 
lowest level of govemment that can intemalize benefits and costs of decision 
making for the specific service. The subsidiary principle adopted by the European 
Union conforms to this view by requiring that the assignment of responsibility 
should be to the lowest level of govemment unless a convincing case can be made 
for a higher leve I assignment"38• 
35 
In particu]ar, geographers tend to distinguish between Unitary State and Federa] State, a11 of 
them subdivided in further minor administrative Units, which possess some locai powers. This 
broad distinction and the reasons underlying the two models are at the core ofthe debate between 
centralized versus decentralized state, or using Barbina's definitions (Barbina, G.: la Geografia 
Umana nel Mondo Contemporaneo, Carocci Editore, Roma, 2001, (p. 116), between a form at 
pyramidal structure and a perfect bureaucratic structure offsetting any attempts of separation on 
the one band, and one based on the reliance on some peripheral territoria] agencies with partial 
autonomy. 
36 
Hagget, P.: Geography: A Modern Synthesis, Second Edition, Harper & Row, Publishers, New 
York, 1975, (p. 6). 
37 Hope, K. R.: Decentralisation and Loca] Governance Theory and the Practice in Botswana, 
Deve/opmentSouthern Africa, Vol 17, No 4, Gaberone, 2000, ( p. 521). The concept ofregional 
state is definitively more accurate to frame decentralization processes, especially ifwe see 
regionalism as a process of delegation of power by centrai authority to loca] administration, as 
opposite to federalism, where the locai authorities generally delegate some oftheir powers to a 
centrai one (Lizza, G.: Territorio e Potere, Itinerari di geografia, UTET, Torino, 1996, (p. 100). 
38 
Huther & Shah : "Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governanceto the Debate on Fiscal 
Decentralization", Policy Research Working Paper Series, n. 1894, World Bank, Washington 
o.e., 1999. 
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In their review of decentralization in developing countries, a milestone on the 
topic, Rondinelli define four major types of decentralization: the deconcentration, 
delegati on, devolution and privatization39: 
Deconcentation, probably the least extensive form of decentralization, can be 
defined as the transfer of authority and responsibility to lower level or sub-
national Units within centrai govemment agencies40• It basically entails moving 
some workload and discretion from centrally located officials to locai offices and 
staff, mostly outside the capitai. This is the most frequently used from of 
decentralization in developing countries since the early l 970s41 • One of the 
characteristics of this system is the fact that deconcentrated staff of Iine ministers 
is accountable to their ministry itself, and not to the locally elected authorities and 
that the shift of authority is often limited to a specific functions or sectorial 
intervention, while remaining within the centrai govemment or agency 
responsibility and structure42• One of its examples has been the creation of 
regional development councils and planning staff in the Philippines, which have 
operated as subordinate Units of the National Economie and Development 
Authority43 . 
39 Rondinelli, D. at al .: 1983, Op. Cit. 
40 Hope, K. R.: 2000, Op. Cit. (p. 521) 
41 Rondinelli, D. et al. : 1983, Op. Cit. 
42 
NIBR: Evaluation of Decentralisation and Development, Evaluation Report 3.97, Norwegian 
Institute for Urban and Regional Research, Blindem, 1997, (p. 8). 
43 Rondinelli, D. et al.: 1983, Op. Cit. 
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Delegation is defined as "the transfer of specific authority and decision-making 
power to organizations that are outside the regular bureaucratic structure and that 
are only indirectly controlled by the centrai govemment, such as parastatals and 
semi-autonomous agencies"44• This form of decentralization generally takes piace 
in sectors that have a fairly good income-generating basis, such as: energy 
production and supply, telecommunications, public transport, etc45. Several 
examples can be found in the exploitation, processing and export business of 
minerals and petroleum in developing countries, where govemments have 
favoured to delegate these functions to publicly owned companies or special 
authorities, as opposite to just leaving private enterprises to take over the 
responsibility. Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) in Mexico, PETROBRAS in Brazil 
and PERTAMINA in Indonesia are just a few examples of public companies, 
which played a major role in the development of oil and mining in developing 
countries 46• 
Devolution refers to "the creation or the strengthening - financially or legally - of 
subnational units of govemment, the activities of which are substantially outside 
the direct contro} of the centrai govemment"47• Under this form of 
decentralization, locai units of govemment are characterized by autonomy and 
independence, as well as being legally distinct and separate from the centrai 
govemment, which only exercise an indirect, supervisory contrai over them. 
44 Hope, K. R.: 2000, Op. Cit 
45 NIBR: 1997, Op. Cit. 
46 
Rondinelli, D. et al.: 1983, Op. Cit. (p. 17). 
47 Ibidem: p 19. 
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Moreover, locai sector staff is accountable to the locai elected councils and to the 
population at locai leve I, rather than to centrai ministries48 • One of the most 
advanced example of devolution has been the one occurring in Papua New Guinea 
during the mid-70s, when the country devolved full legislative and management 
responsibility for a large set of functions to the provincia} govemments, including 
the possibility to levy and collect taxes, in addition to receiving the revenues from 
some licenses and royalties at national level and grants from the centrai 
govemment to cover the costs of the administration of functions devolved to 
Privatization is finally the "transfer of contrai and responsibility for govemment 
function and services to the private sector - private voluntary organizations or 
private enterprises"50• Through privatization, there is a shift in development 
responsibility from the state to the private sector, while the state retains its role of 
regulator and standard setter51 • Examples of privatization are becoming more and 
more frequent in developing countries, especially as a consequence to the 
mushrooming of non-govemmental organization and the increase of foreign direct 
investment. Rondinelli uses the example of the Salvation Army, which has fully 
operated some village health clinics in Ghana for more than three decades, 
funding them by levying user fees and benefiting from contributions worldwide 52• 
48 NIBR: 1997, Op. Cit. 
49 Rondinelli, D. et al.: 1983, Op. Cit (p.22). 
50 Hope, K. R.: 2000, Op. Cit. 
51 NIBR: 1997, Op. Cit. 
52 Rondinelli, D.et al.: 1983, Op. Cit. (p 25). 
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2.2. The Decentralization debate 
Decentralization can serve different purposes and has been supported or opposed 
by economists or politica! scientists for a variety of reasons. Much of this support 
comes from traditional economie theories, namely those on fiscal federalism53 • 
These traditional analyses have stressed the role of locai governments in 
guaranteeing a better match between preferences and government products and 
services at locai level. In particular Oates finds that decentralization is the 
preferred system where preferences and tastes are heterogeneous and divergent 
across the country and no major spillovers can be obtained by producing common 
products and services54• These arguments are usually based on competiti on across 
locai jurisdictions, or informational advantages at more locai levels and have a 
particular relevance when there is a large mobility and citizens can easily move to 
other districts to seek better response to their needs (voting by feet), such as in the 
case of the United States. 
Support to decentralization has also come from some political scientists and 
political economy analysts, who have placed political accountability at the heart 
of the debate on decentralization55• According to these authors, citizens exert 
53 See Tiebout, C. M.: "A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures," Joumal of Political Economy, Voi 
64, 1956, (p. 416-24) and Oates, W.: Fiscal Federalism, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1972. 
54 Oates, 1972, op. cit. 
55 Besley T., and S. Coate: "Centralized versus decentralized provision oflocal public goods: a 
political economy analysis," NBER working paper 7084, Cambridge (Univ. Press), 1999. 
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greater effort in monitoring government agencies when they are more locai, and 
hence decentralization increases accountability by bringing government closer to 
the people. A comparative analysis of voter behavior in locai and national election 
in India also proves that voter vigilance and government accountability is higher 
in locai elections56 
The arguments in opposition to the decentralization also come from the field of 
political science. Most of them focus on the risk of locai capture and the possible 
distortions arising from small electoral processes and environment, where small 
locai groups may gain decisive influence over locai govemment, as apposite to 
having their weight be diluted in a larger politica! process57• An other similar 
argument is the one put forward by Jean-Pierre Jacob, under the name of 
"decentralized despotism"58, while referring to conditi on of the rural areas of 
many African countries during the colonia! period and some countries after the 
independence, where the power is almost entirely delegated to locai traditional or 
non-traditional authorities. In these situations, no access to land, as well as other 
rights, is granted outside of the despotic mie of these authorities. According to 
this argument, decentralization may end up widening the "distance" between 
Persson T., G.Roland, and G. Tabellini : "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability", 
Working Paper No. 136, Center for Economie Studi es, University of Munich, Munich, I 997. 
56 
Kemani, S.: "Political Cycles in a Developing Economy: Effects ofElections in the fndian 
States", Policy Research Working Paper 2454, World Bank, Washington D.C., 2000. 
57 
Smith, B. C.: Decentraliz.ation: Tue territorial Dimension ofthe State, George Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1985. 
58 
Jacob, J. P .: "La Décentralisation Comme Distance. Réflexions sur la Mise en Piace des 
Collectivités Territoriales en Milieu Rural Ouest-Africain", Politique Africaine, No. 71 : 133-47, 
Paris, October, 1998. 
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urban and rural areas, reinforcing the dualism between locai and centrai 
govemment, and leading to duplication, altematives, rather than to a synthesis 
between center and periphery59• In fact, decentralization may lead to increasing 
regional disparities, when making locai govemments responsible for their own 
funding and delivery. Moreover, especially in Ieast developed countries, there is a 
high risk that devoting the already scarce resources to locai govemments in order 
to maintain their functioning may leave little for the production of basic public 
services60• 
Furthermore, decentralization faces serious politica! challenges. As Olowu 
pointed out, one of the most important ones is the refusal by the centrai politica} 
and administrative authorities to abandon their monopole61 • This factor mostly 
refers to the widespread politica! behavior by most politicians and administrators, 
who are not inclined to share their power with other institutional actors, and even 
less with locai administration. According to this argument, decentralization would 
be perceived as a "zero sum game" where the gains by the locai authorities are 
matched by losses at centrai level. This is particularly true when there are not 
enough pressures or other politica! incentives to decentralize, as we will see more 
in-depth in the chapter on "building consensus". This reluctance can al so go 
beyond the willingness to hold power per se, but can also result from genuine 
59 Ibidem: p. 134. 
60 
Bonfiglioli, A.: Empowering The Poor, Locai Governance For Poverty Reduction, UNCDF, 
New York 2003, (p 44). 
61 Olow, D.: 1998 Op. Cit. (p. 522). 
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concerns about national unity and ethnic divisions, especially in those societies 
where the balance of power of different groups is particularly challenging62• 
Asante and Ayee also argue, that decentralization can be feared whereas it may 
"dislocates the nation, either by encouraging the appetites of certain regions for 
autonomy or by encouraging wealthier regions to operate as self-sufficient 
territories to the detriment of poorer regions. The problem of guarantees remains 
the issue that divides supporters and opponents of decentralization" 63 • 
Due to the importance of the political process, Rondinelli argues that 
decentralization tend to be more successful in countries which face a certain 
political stability. As often developing countries face large economie and political 
crisis, decentralization cannot be used, as a "last-ditch effort to avoid the 
catastrophe"64• He continues by saying that government can overcome worst crisis 
by centralizing, but they may want to later decentralize to avoid potentially deeper 
disasters. As we will see in the case study section, examples of these avoidable 
crises in developing countries are certainly not rare. 
Prud'homme, in his famous article on the "dangers of decentralization", 
concludes that the question is not whether and to which extend to decentralize in 
62 Bonfiglioli, A.: 2003, Op. Cit. (p. 51). 
63 
Asante F., and J. Ayee: "Decentralization and Poverty Reduction", Presented at the JSSER-
University of Ghana-Cornell University International Conference on "Ghana at the Half 
Century," July 18-20, 2004, Accra, Ghana 2004, ( p. 3-4). 
64 Rondinelli D.: 1983, Op. Cit (p 71). 
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generai, but rather what functions, in which sectors and in which regions. This 
Iatest point calls for different treatment of geographical areas65 • In fact, 
Prud'homme argues that decentralization in India cannot be discussed with the 
same concepts and words as decentralization in Tunisia, nor decentralization in 
cities as to the villages. For this reason, a proper analysis of this debate shall 
progressively focus the geographic lenses to specific areas66• 
2.3. Decentralization in the developing world 
In the past two decades, many developing countries have begun to experience 
programs aiming at improving service delivery through some form of support to 
locai govemments, community participation, direct transfer to families and 
contracting out of some traditionally public service and products to private sector 
or NGOs. This process has gained a certain momentum in many developing 
countries across different continents, such as Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia and Costa 
Rica in Latin America; Ghana, Uganda and South Africa in Africa; and 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, India and Pakistan in Asia67 • 
One of the most Iargely used mechanisms for donors and multilateral 
development institutions has been the establishment of Social Funds, which, as 
65 Prud'homme, R.: "Tue Dangers ofDecentralization", The World Bank Research Observer, voi. 
10, no. 2, Washington D.C., 1995, (p. 214). 
66 Idem. 
67 Bardhan P. and D. Mookherjee: Decentralization and Accountability in lnfrastructure Delivery 
in Developing Countries, Blackwell Publishing, November 2003. 
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defined by the World Bank "aim to empower communities by enabling them to 
participate in the selection, implementation, and operation and maintenance of 
development projects. Such funds provide direct financing for community 
projects designed to quickly improve basic services and reduce poverty". The 
magnitude of the boost of this new mechanism can be seen by looking at the data 
from the World Bank, which since 1987, has approved more than 100 social fund 
projects worth around $3 .5 billion in more than 60 of its client countries68 • These 
funds have been coupled with the increased adoption of the so called Community-
Driven Development (CDD) approach. This can be defined as "a process by 
which community groups organize and take actions to achieve their common 
goals, in the context of an enabling environment with support from responsive 
institution". Russo et al. (2004, p.33) point out that "these processes are 
community-driven because of their focus on locai priorities and involvement of 
locai community members at all stages of the preparati on and implementation of a 
program or project"69• In this sense the so-called "bottom-up" approach is linked 
to a sort of "locai democracy" 70• 
While the Socia} Funds and the CDD approach are shaping development projects, 
decentralization is gaining grounds at institutional level, both politica! and 
68
World Bank: "Promoting good governance with social funds and decentralization, PIIBMnotes 
51, Washington D.C., January 2001. 
69 Russo, F. et al.: "Community Driven Development Approaches in Natural Resources 
Management", Thinking Out Loud V, Spring, World Bank, Washington D.C. ,2004, (p. 33). 
70 
Ibidem: p. 45. For more on CDD, see: Narayan, D. (Ed): Empowerment and Poverty Reduction, 
a Sourcebook, World Bank, Washington D.C., 2002; Shackleton, Set al.: "Devolution and 
Community Based Natural Resources Management", ODI Natural Resources Perspectives, n. 76, 
DFID, London, 2002; or www.worldbank.org/cdd . 
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administrative. Both processes have been increasingly supported by the donor 
community and many govemments in developing world, under the same 
assumption that decisions and preferences are better expressed as locai level, as 
argued by the fiscal decentralization stream 71 • 
According to Prud'homme, statistical analyses suggest that decentralization tend 
to increase with income level and, although the causai relation is not clear, 
decentralization is more likely to be successful in middle or high-income 
countries 72• In this sense, Riggs talks about a "circular causati on", where the 
weakness of locai government is a consequence of underdevelopment, and, in 
tum, the latter is caused by the locai government weakness. According to Riggs 
"the strength of locai administration tends to vary directly with the degree of 
economie development" 73• 
However, in bis review of experiences of decentralization in developing countries, 
presents a more balanced mix of positive and negative results 74• In his analysis, it 
is clear that developing countries face some specific challenges and even when 
71 For more on the linkages between Socia] Funds and Decentralization, see World Bank: 2001, 
Op. Cit. 
72 
Prud'homme:, "The Dangers ofDecentralization", The World Bank Research Observer, voi. 
10, no. 2,Washington D.C., 1995, (p. 21). 
73Riggs, F.: Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society, Houghton 
Miftlin Coy s, Boston, 1964, (p. 374). 
74 Rondinelli, D. et al.: 1993, Op Cit. 
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programs have been thriving, not ali the expected outcomes have occurred to 
either centrai or locai Ievel75• 
For instance, the 1994 decentralization process in Bolivia has often praised as a 
good case of decentralization in developing countries. According to Faguet, it has 
been a typical case in which locai govemment's knowledge of locai needs has 
proved to be largely superior to the centrai govemment technical and 
organizational capacity of providing public services 76• Empirica} analyses have 
demonstrated a shift in investments towards education, agriculture, urban 
development, and water and sanitation. However, Manor's study on the same 
country does not reach the conclusion that this allocation may have reached the 
goal of poverty reduction 77. 
In fact, a frequent conclusion emerging from a wide body of literature is indeed 
the relatively poor correlation between decentralization and poverty reduction. 
Crook and Sverisson for instance, found that some of the so-called successful 
stories in decentralizing in Colombia and Brazil have not been equally successful 
in reducing regional disparities and overall poverty78 • Johnson suggests several 
75 
Cheema G. S., and D. Rondinelli: Decentralization and Development, Sage, Beverly Hills, 
2003. 
76 Faguat, J. P.: 2001, Op. Cit. 
77 
Manor, J.: "Democratic Decentralization in Africa and Asia", JDS Bulletin, Vol 26, No 2, 
Institute of Development Studi es at the University of Sussex, Brighton 1995. 
78 
Crook R., and A. Sverisson : "Decentralization and Poverty Alleviation in Developing 
Countries: A Comparative Analysis or, Is West Bengal Unique?", JDS Working Paper 130. 
Institute ofDevelopment Studies at the University of Sussex, Brighton, 2001. 
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possible explanations79• The first one is linked to the problem of raising public 
revenue in rural areas, where the added value and therefore taxable revenues are 
generally scarce. This problem is often exacerbated by the fact that the nature of 
decentralization in developing countries has often taken the form of delegation of 
systems of service delivery, without associating devolution of financial authority80 
By doing that, many delegation processes bave left the locai authorities with new 
burdens and no additional resources, hampering the credibility of the overall 
reform. 
Furthermore, Johnson argues that poverty may have an incapacitating impact on 
the ability to engage in formai politica! processes, which are apre-requisite fora 
well functioning and accountable locai govemance system. This is linked to the 
information gaps but also to the costs entailed into the political action, which may 
prevent the poor from participating actively to politics. Finally, as Crook and 
Sverisson and others have also pointed, the problem of locai elite capture is one of 
the most recurrent factors hampering the effectiveness of decentralization81 • 
Decentralization in this sense may simply end up empowering locai elites and 
carrying on existing inequalities and ultimately poverty. 
79 Johnson, C. : "Locai Democracy, Democratic Decentralisation and Rural Development: 
Theories, Challenges and Options for Policy", Deve/opment Policy Review n.19, Oxford, 2001. 
80 Bardhan P.,and D. Mookherjee: 2003, Op. cit. 
81 Crook R., and A. Sverisson: 2001, Op. Cit. 
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2.4. Decentralization in Africa 
The African continent is facing large economie and politica! problems. After 
almost half a century of independence, the continent features the lowest average 
economie growth rates and pro-capita income in the world, as well as level of 
accrued foreign debt for many countries largely unsustainable. Moreover, only 18 
African independent states out of 54 bave avoided successful military coups. Of 
these relatively stable countries, at least one third bave experienced severa! coup 
attempts, revolts or civil conflicts. According to a fascinating thesis by Wunsch 
and Oluwu (1990), this sluggish performance both in economie and political 
terms can be largely attributed to the so-called "Failure of the Centralized African 
State"82• According to the authors, centralization facilitates exploitation and 
abuses of the powerless by the a few powerful, did not help manage the lack of 
information, understanding and capacity to adapt to the reality of the rural areas, 
and restricted self-organization and the ability of non-centrai-state actors to 
contribute to the locai development. This latter point is particularly true in Africa, 
where many labor unions, cooperative organizations, private enterprises, 
traditional political authorities and voluntary organizations have been banned or 
controlled. Some of these organizations bave survived, but often in a defensive 
posture, limiting their chances to contribute to the development. 
82 
Wusnch J., and D. Olowu: The Failure of CentraUzed State, Jnstitutions and Self-Governance 
in Africa, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1990, (p12-13). 
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Despite its appeal, the above thesis does not fully explain the current level of 
under-development of many African countries, nor does explain why some 
African countries such as South Africa performed better than most sub-Saharan 
nations although the its decentralization process may not bave gone further than 
the one of many other countries. Y et the continent has faced experienced several 
decentralization efforts. Olowu 83 speaks about three major waves in Africa. 
Immediately after the independence, while consolidating the nation State, 
decentralization was considered as a key tool for the military authority or the 
single party regime. In this context locai administrations served as a means to 
ensure the respect of the law and the order, and served the purpose of 
implementing development policies designed by the centrai authorities. In this 
sense, decentralization was pretty similar to the form of "indirect rule"84 of some 
colonia} administration, which relied heavily on local authorities to guarantee the 
stability of their dominati on. In some way, the newly independent authorities 
replicated the center-periphery context, which characterized the relation between 
the colonial metropolitan area and the autre-meres territories. 
The second phase of decentralization, according to Oluwu, took piace during the 
70s and 80s, when most African govemments embarked structural adjustment 
programs and saw decentralization as a way to reduce centrai govemment 
expenditures. Most of this decentralization has taken the shape of privatizing 
83 Olowu, D.: 1998, Op. Cit. 
84 
Fora larger treatment ofthe indirect rule see the Ghana case study 
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services at locai level. In the 70s and 80s, which have been years of fiscal crisis 
for most of the African continent, most African countries have experienced the so-
called state retrenchment, mostly as a consequence of the policy advice by IMF 
and World Bank, as a means to emerge from the crises. However Van de Walle 
and others argue that the retrenchment has not been as large as planned, and the 
so-called shrinking of the African state has been in reality a "slimming down" of 
the government functions and role in the economy85. 
Finally during the 90s with the widespread of democracy in Africa, the continent 
experienced a third wave of decentralization, which was linked to the 
liberalization and politica! democratization processes. This third phase is 
somehow a continuation of the previous one, while aiming at strengthening the 
participation of the locai populations and enhancing the accountability of locai 
institutions towards them86• This third stage of decentralization has been strongly 
supported by donors, who are viewing this process as a key element of their 
support to the democratization and improved governance in the politica! life of the 
continent. Almost every African country has in fact embarked a decentralization 
process funded by external donors in the 90s. In Mali, a country which always 
struggled to strike a balance between locai and centrai instances87, the 1995 law 
85
Van de Walle et al.: Beyond Structural Adjustment, The institutional Context of African 
Deve/opment, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003. 
86 Olowu, D.: 1998, Op. Cit. 
87 
Soon after its independence in 1960, Mali attempted to organize its territory encompassing the 
current territory and the one of Senegal into the Mali federation. The federation had a short life 
and gave birth to the separate states of Senegal and Mali two months after the independence 
(Glassner, M.I.:1993, Op. Cit.). 
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created 701 communes, replacing the system of arrondissements and attributing 
them responsibility for primary education, health care, locai road, transport, water 
and cultura} events. In Burkina Faso, the "Commission Nationale de 
Decentralization" (CND) was established in 1993 to promote decentralization. 
Senegal created regional Councils in 1996 and granted new functions to the 
municipalities, such as locai taxation and land management88 • Uganda, whose 
state has experienced severa! forms to deal with locai govemment issues89, is one 
of the African countries which have probably gone the furthest in 
decentralization. Its current locai governance structure, made up of 45 district 
councils and 903 sub-country level councils, has been set by the 1995 
Cqnstitution and the 1997 Locai Govemment Act, which have officially 
transferred a variety ofresponsibility from centrai to locai govemment90• 
According to Oluwu most African decentralization reforms ended up creating a 
similar prototype91 • After abolishing the inherited structures of locai government, 
new administrative units are created, a law or decree is passed and declares that 
all govemment activities in a region or district bave to be coordinated by a senior 
politica! or administrative officiai, completely responsible to the center, and 
88 
Van de Walle et al.: 2003, Op. Cit. 
89 
At the time of independence in 1962 Uganda, was a federati on of 4 kingdoms, two territori es 
and I O districts, and later became a solid unitary State. Contrary to the case of Mali, the example 
ofUganda is a typical one where the federai state is the :first step towards a further integration and 
the development of a Unitary State (Glassner, M.I.: 1993, Op. Cit.). 
9° For more info on the decentralization in Uganda, see Van de Walle, N. et al: "Democracy, 
Govemance and Conflict Strategie Assessment for Uganda", Report presented to United States 
Agency for International Development Democracy and Governance Center, Management Systems 
Intemational, Washington D.C., January, 25, 2001. 
91 
Olowu, D.: 1998, Op. Cit. 
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finally some sort of popular committee is created to advise the regional or district 
coordinator. All these units relate to each other hierarchically92 • 
Despite the above described pattern, the motives behind decentralization in Africa 
vary a lot. De Muro, in his review of experiences of decentralization in Sub-
Saharan Africa, observes two main sets of reasons: those of politica} nature and 
the economie ones93• The first group includes: (i) the need to maintain law and 
order in the locality, such as in the case of Burkina Faso and Uganda during the 
1980s94; (ii) the quest for foster democratic, popular and participating 
governments, such as in Malawi and Zambia, where decentralization was a part of 
the electoral agenda; (iii) the result of internal demands for a devolution of power, 
like in South Africa, where National party (i.e. white minority) and Zulu pressed 
for decentralization; (iv) the outcome of external pressure, like the one exercised 
by World Bank, United Nations Development Program or even bilatera! donors 
like France, which put pressure for politica! reform on all the African francophone 
countries (thus the nickname "Paristroika"). 
92 Ibidem: p 76. 
93 
De Muro, P. et al. "An overview of decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa", Paper Presented at 
the XII Convegno biennale dell 'AISSEC, Siena, 1999. 
94 In Burkina Faso, the head of state urged the population to create committees for the defense of 
the revolution in every neighborhood or villages. In the mid 80s these committees played a key 
role in managing de facto most ofthe local affairs. In Uganda, the Resistance Council system was 
created in 1986 specifically to meet the demand for locai authorities, allowing locai people to 
control locai officials, policies and services. 
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The second group includes: (i) the confidence that decentralization would 
contribute to promote rapid social and economie development, such as in the case 
of Mauritania; (ii) the need to lower the level of public expenditure, especially 
when implementing macroeconomie policies reform (structural adjustment), such 
as in the case ofTanzania at the beginning of l 990s95 • 
A further distinction among different decentralization in Africa related to the 
variety of forms decentralization has taken. As shown in the following chart, 
decentralization in Africa and particularly in the Sub-Saharan region, has taken a 
variety of different forms. As displayed in the chart below, these range from the 
deconcentration in Tanzania96 to a fairly advance version of devolution in South 
Africa, as well as some progressive but yet, limited version of delegation in 
Ghana, Uganda and Senegal. 
95 De Muro, P. et al.: 1999, Op. Cit. 
96 For more on the case of Tanzania, see McLean K., "Characterizing Decentralization in 
Tanzania", mimeo, World Bank, Washington DC, 1997 
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Figure 2 Typology of decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Deconcentration Delegati on 
Tanzania 
Còte d'lvoire Burkina Faso Mali 
Guinea 
Nigeria Madagascar Senegal 
Deresponsibility 
Zambia · Ghana 
Zimbabwe 
Devolution 
Uganda Botswana 
South Africa 
Kenya 
Locai Autonom 
I-·· · 
Source: De Muro et al. : 1999, Op. Cit. 
According to the above chart, however few African countries qualify completely 
for the pure definitions described in the previous chapter. Most of them fall, 
according to De Muro, under the hybrid category of de-responsibility97, 
characterized by a low level of autonomy and accountability, and where "locai 
97 
De Muro, P. et al: 1998, Op. Cit. De Muro further distinguishes between "overcontrolled" and 
"perversely regulated" decentralization. In the earlier case, the process has been more rhetorical 
than real and it is not clear yet which tasks and functions are to be handled at the locai leve! or 
where elected councils have a purely advisory role. In the latter, even ifplanning and 
administrative functions were clearly transferred to lower levels, human and financial resources 
are generally not sufficient to enable locai govemments to discharge those functions . In other 
terms, there is some (de jure) assignment of functional responsibilities and some degree of locai 
politica! autonomy, but there is a built-in vertical gap - a Jack of correspondence between the 
extent ofresponsibilities oflocal govemments and the amount ofresources they can count on. 
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govemments are accountable to their constituents, but centrai govemments do not 
allow full discretion or does not transfer enough resources for decision-making 
and management"98 . 
The result of many of these forms of hybrid decentralization has been often poor. 
The overall success of these reforms is in most cases fairly poor and the African 
state can be stili characterized as centralized in a variety of quantitative measures, 
such as the one below, featuring the percentage distribution of govemment 
personnel at the locai level. 
Table 1 Percentage of personnel at locai level over total number ·or employee 
Source: Wunsch, J. and D. Oluwu: 1990, Op. Cit. 
Other quantitative measures supporting the concept of a "centralized African 
state" include the ratio of public revenues spent by centrai over those of locai 
98 Idem. 
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govemments, the taxes raised at centrai versus locai level and proportion of 
govemment expenditures over GNP99• However, Wunsch and Oluwu argue the 
criticai difference between the African decentralization is rather qualitative100• For 
instance, basically no African country locai govemment has any independent 
judicial authority, in many countries locai self-goveming institutions have been 
complemented or replaced by field administrative agencies and, even within line 
ministries, there is a disproportion of manpower and financial resources at 
headquarter compared with the field agencies. Furthermore, most senior and 
experienced officials are based in the capitai city. 
As presented by Wunsch, many of these failures derive from a mix of centrai 
reluctance to delegate authority in the areas of planning, budgeting, personnel and 
finance, and the difficulties in redesigning complex organizations to support the 
decentralization process 101 • Indeed, following Rondinelli's words, "ultimately, 
decentralization is a politica! decision, and its implementation a reflection of a 
country' s political process"102• In this sense, multi-lateral development institutions 
have often blamed decentralization failures on poor implementation by the centrai 
govemment and its agencies103• According to this visage point, implementation 
problems were a result of lack of clarity on the objectives, ambiguous legislation. 
One other possible explanation is connected with the already mentioned theory of 
99 Wunsch, J. and D. Olowu: 1990, Op. Cit. 
100 Ibidem: p. 4-5. 
101 
Wunsch, J.: "Decentralization, Locai Govemance and Recentralization in Africa", Public 
Administration and Development, 21, 200,1 (p. 277-288). 
102 Rondinelli, D.: 1993 Op. Cit. 
103 Wunsch, J. and D. Olowu: 1990, Op Cit 84-85. 
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Riggs104, which would draw a casual link between the African underdeveloped 
economie, social and political environment, and the failure to achieve an effective 
decentralization. 
Other explanations focus more on the special features of African policymaking at 
locai level. As argued by Crook, "unlike in South Asia and in some Latin 
American political systems, locai govemment representation of disadvantaged 
groups in Africa is not part of popular political discourse"105• "On the contrary -
Crook continues - electors tend to seek the association of well-connected, urban-
based elite groups with the politics and development of decentralized authorities, 
in order to increase the effectiveness of their community's representation and 
thereby increase potential for beneficiai patronage and capitai investment. This is 
in many respects simply recognition of political realities in systems where 
patronage networks are deeply entrenched". 
According to Crook, in fact elite capture has been the key explanation for the 
failure of decentralization programs in the achievement of poverty reduction in 
Africa106• This capture was also facilitated by the desire of many ruling elites to 
use decentralization ad a means to create and sustain power bases in the 
104 Riggs, F.: 1964, Op. Cit. 
105 
Crook, R .: "Four Years ofthe Ghana District Assemblies in Operation: Decentralization, 
Democratization and Administrative Performance", Public Administration and Development. 1, 
1994. 
106 Idem 
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countryside, rather than pushing pro-poor reforms. In tums, these locai elites 
demonstrated little interest in pro-poor reform. 
Ali the above arguments bring some insights into the analysis of specific cases of 
both success and failure of specific decentralization reform. However, in each 
African country these factors bave intertwined in a peculiar way, mostly based on 
the specific characteristics of the territory, colonial heritage and political culture. 
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3. THE CASE OF GHANA 
3.1. Background 
3.1.1. Brief History107 
The current territory of Ghana 108 covers basically the area, which, in the late 19th 
century belonged to the Ashanti Kingdom. As displayed in the figure below, the 
kingdom was surrounded by other powerful African kingdoms such as the 
Dahomey and Y oruba, and was located in a region predominantly under the 
French sphere of influence. The Brits, whose mayor colonies were Iocated on the 
South and Eastem part of the continent, carne as traders and invaded this strip of 
Iand in the hearth of West Africa in 1874, renaming it the "Gold Coast" and 
107 
This paragraph draws extensively from EIU, Ghana, Country Profile 2004 
108 
Ghana's territory is 238,537 square kilometers large (approximately equaling the size ofthe 
United Kingdom). The country faces the Guinea Coast on the South and is surrounded by three 
countries: Burkina Faso on the northem border, the Ivory Cost on the western border and Togo on 
the eastem border. Tue territory, which largely coincides with the southem section ofthe Volta 
river basin, is made of a highland, which has a depressi on area in correspondence to the tlow of 
the river (IGA: Calendario Atlante de Agostini, 2003, Istituto Geografico De Agostini, Novara, 
2002). 
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declaring it a British colony. However, it took around 30 years of struggles for the 
Brits to finally take its full contro I. 
Figure 3. Map of Colonia) Africa (1892) 
Source: Gardiner's Atlas, Africa 1892, 2002, FC Inc. 
Decentralization and Governance in Developing Countries: The Case ofGhana 54 
The British influence puts this country at odds with several other neighbor 
countries, whose politica} system were highly influenced by the French colonial 
model. The "indirect rule", which, as we will see later on, set the stage for a 
beginning of the decentralized model, left many educated elites out of politics. 
These groups were later joined by others, like the former soldiers who, after 
fighting the W orld W ar Two, began demanding a role in the administration and 
business opportunities in the colonial system. At the end of the 40s, these groups 
split into moderates and radicals, the latter led by K wame Nkrumah and bis 
Convention People's Party (CPP). Young people and the poorer sections of the 
middle class supported the CPP, leading it to victory on the country's first 
election in 1951. Sis years later, under the strong leadership of Nkrumah, Ghana 
became the first Sub-Saharian African country to achieve its independence. 
Nkrumah' s legacy was very important. The "father of the nati on", as most 
Ghanaians refer him to, laid down the basis of Ghana' s current industriai 
infrastructures and introduced a one-part state under a socialist ostentation. Soon 
after independence through, Ghana began experiencing a period of instability and 
the descent into widespread corruption. Between 1957 and 1981 nine changes of 
govemment, including four military coups, took piace. However, the country 
escaped the violence that has been characterized many other African countries in 
the post-colonial politics. 
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The last two of these four coups set the stage for the rise and domination of the 
politica! scene by John Rawlings, a flight-lieutenant from the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council, a group of left-leaning young officers who set the fight 
against corruption as their top priority. Rawlings led the country through the 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) govemment, a military 
technocratic regime a military technocratic regime, which first embarked socialist 
rhetoric and later free-market reforms. In 1992 he gave Rawlings introduced the 
current constitution and restored multiparty elections, which he and his new party, 
the National Democratic Congress (NDC), won for two consecutive times ( 1992 
and 1996). In these two elections, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the largest 
opposition party, grew from 11 to 67 seats and became the most credible one to 
challenge the NDC in the 2000 elections. The results however reinforced the view 
of the NPP as a southem-based party dominated by the Ashanti regi on. 
The 2000 elections gave the presidency to John Agyekum Kufuor and his NPP, 
representing the first democratic transfer of power in nineteen years and putting 
an end to the almost two decades of Rawlings ruling. The election also marked the 
beginning of a right-leaning, free-market policies. The NPP set its main manifesto 
goals as achieving macroeconomie stability, accelerating real GDP growth and 
improving infrastructure. Many of these goals have been achieved, as the country 
is benefiting a solid economie growth, fairly low inflation (by comparison with 
other West Africa countries) and the results of many infrastructure projects. In the 
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2004 elections, Kufuor has been confinned as the president and a second term has 
recenti y started. 
3.1.2. Ghana's Economy and Territory 
Ghana has a population of 18,903,079 inhabitants, according to the census of the 
year 2000, and, as shown in the following map, it is divided administratively into 
ten regions, each of them with a regional capitai and administered by the regional 
minister. These are Greater Accra, Western Region, Centrai Region, Volta 
Region, Eastern Region, Ashanti Region, Brong Ahafo Region, on the one hand, 
and the three regions in the Northern part of the country (Northern, Upper East 
and Upper West regions) on the other hand109• 
109 Govemment ofGhana: 2003, Op. cit. 
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Figure 4 Ghana, Political Map 
Source: Magellan Geographix, Santa Barbara, 1992. 
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Ghana's economy is mostly based on agriculture, which employs about 60 percent 
of the labor force and contributes to around 30-40 percent of the GDP. The main 
export crops are cocoa, timber and non-traditional products like pineapples. Most 
of these crops are cultivated in the southem forest belt of the Ashanti, Bring-
Ahafo, Eastem and Western regions. Mining (mainly gold) has also become one 
of the biggest sources of foreign exchange. Gold deposits are found in Ashanti 
and Western region, where the ore is concentrated and most mining activities are 
located, and in some parts ofCentral and Northem regions110• 
Thanks to the wealth of natural resources and a strong export base, Ghana was 
well positioned to achieve a sustained increase in economie growth after 
independence. However, the country has not achieved it potential, despite a good 
economie performance in the 1960s, as it faced an economie decline starting from 
the mid- l 970s, due to a variety of reasons ranging from the unfavorable 
intemational context to the above described political instability. The economy 
managed to pick up in the mid- 1980s, thanks to the high cocoa and gold prices, 
and a peri od of sustained growth followed 111 • 
Despite these results,, the growth has not been strong enough to make up for the 
"lost decades". Pro-capita income is therefore still at very low leve I, compared to 
110 EIU: 2004, Op. Cit. 
111 
World Bank: Country Assistance Strategy ofthe World Bank Groupfor the Republic Of 
Ghana, Report No. 27838-GH, February 20, Washington D.C., 2004. 
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the world average, but also to the one of Sub-Saharan Africa, as shown in the 
following figure. 
Figure 5 GDP per Capita 1985 - 2000 
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Source: EarthTrends 2003, "Ghana", Country Profile, http://earthtrends.wri.org 
As shown in the Annex 1, the most recent indicators stili depicts a situation that is 
often comparable and in some cases worse than the many Sub-Saharan countries. 
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Por instance, according to the World Bank112, the pro-capita GNim in 2003 was 
estimated at 320 USD, well below the average of the Sub-saharan countries ( 490 
USD) and the one of the low income group ( 450 USD). According to the same 
source, 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. 
Nevertheless, the recently acquired economie and politica! stability lead many 
observers to be optimism. The W orld Bank, for instance, defines Ghana "as a 
strong performer in sub-Saharan Africa and is one of the few countries in Africa 
with the potential to achieve some, if not all, of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Ghana's economie potential and strong social capitai base set it 
apart from its troubled sub-region. The country has ambitions to achieve middle-
income status114 within one generation, driven by private sector-led growth"115 • 
On whether these hopes would be fulfilled, much depends on how the country is 
going to address its main challenges, many of them linked to the on-going 
decentralization eff orts. 
112 
World Bank: Ghana at a Glance, 2003 available in www.worldbank.org/gh 
113 Gross National Income or GNI, current dollars is the sum ofvalue added by ali resident 
producers plus any produci taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net 
receipts ofprimary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. In 
other words, GNI measures the total income of ali people who are citizens of a particular country 
while GDP (gross domestic product) measures the tota] output of all persons living in a particu]ar 
country's borders. 
114 
According to World Bank, a middle-income country is defined as a country with a pro-capita 
income between 1.505 and 5445 USD (Santi, E. and F. Russo: "La Banca Mondiale da Bretton 
Woods as Oggi" in Caviglia (Ed), Le Istituzioni Finanziarie nel Nuovo Contesto Internazionale, 
LED, Milano, 2004) 
115 World Bank: 2004, Op.Cit. 
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lt is interesting to note how the country, like many of its neighbour West African 
countries on the Gulf of Guinea (such as Togo and Benin), face large disparities, 
as well as a development gap, between its Northern part and the South116• 
Many authors therefore treat this spatial inequality as a "reversed" North-South 
phenomenon 117• Others depict rather a core-periphery structure out of the North-
South spatial economy118• 
Vanderpuye-Orgle, in specific, defines the Ashanti, Eastem and Centrai Regions 
as well as the Western and Brong-Ahafo Regions as the core zone of the nation 
state119• These regions, which make up the forest ecological zone of the country's 
.South, are the prime cocoa, timber and minerai producing areas. The coastal areas 
are al so a part of the core as a consequence of the rapid growth in the port towns. 
One other key climatic factor is the certainly the uneven rainfall level, which 
make agricultural production harder in the North120• As opposite to the fertile 
Southern part, in the North it is therefore not rare to encounter a landscape and an 
arid territory such as the one displayed in the following picture. 
The pick of economie growth experienced in the mid 80 was generally followed 
by an overall poverty levels decreased between 1991/92 and 1998/99 from 52% to 
116 
Fora more detailed treatment of the North-South Dicotomy, see Annex 2 
117 
Songsore, J.: "The Spatial Impress and Dynamics ofUnderdevelopment in Ghana" In: 
Swindell, K., Baba, J.M., Mortimore M. J. (Eds.), Inequality andDevelopment: Case Studiesfrom 
the Third World. Macmillan Publishers, London, 1989. 
118 
Vanderpuye-Orgle: The North-South Divide and the Disappearing Middle Class: An Analysis 
ofSpatial lnequality and Polarization in Ghana, Cornell (Univ. Press), 2004. 
119 Ibidem 
120 EIU: 2004, Op. Cit. 
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40%. Following the same trend, extreme poverty declined from 37% to 27% over 
the same period. However, this progress masks the uneven decline in poverty of 
. d d . . h' I 121 growmg an eepenmg poverty m some geograp 1ca areas . 
The evidence suggests that the vulnerability and exclusion among some 
geographical groups, socio-economie groups, gender and age groups may 
have worsened. Population growth during the period may have far outstripped 
the positive impact of growth on the rate of decline in poverty levels in some 
areas. Furthermore, except for the migration of the youth from the rural to the 
urban areas as head porters, street sellers and so forth, poverty levels in some of 
these areas could have been worse than what the statistics reveal. 
As shown in the following figure, there are significant differences in the spatial 
distribution of poverty among Ghanaian regions. If divided by income measure, 
poverty levels are highest in the three northem savannah regions (the Upper East, 
Upper West and Northem Regions), ranging between 69% and 88%. Nine out of 
ten people in the Upper East, eight out of ten in Upper West, seven out of ten in 
Northern Region and five out of ten in Centrai and Eastern Regions were 
classified as poor in 1999 
121 W orld Bank: 2004, Op. Cit. 
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Figure 6 Ghana, Incidence of Poverty - 1999 
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Source: Ghana Statistical Services: Poverty Trends in Ghana 1990 's, Accra, 2000. 
(See Annex 2). Of the ten regions, the Upper East, Northem and Centrai regions 
experienced increases in poverty levels and extreme poverty in the 1990s. 
Decentralization and Governance in Developing Countries: The Case of Ghana 64 
Decentralization and Governance in Developing Countries: The Case o/Ghana 65 
3.2. Current Strategies and Programs 
The Ghana current development strategy is summarized in the Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (GPRS). This represents a comprehensive overview of 
policies, strategies, programmes, and projects to support growth and poverty 
reduction over a three-year period (2002-2004)122• 
The main stated goal of this strategy is to provide the enabling environment that 
will empower all Ghanaians to participate in wealth creation and to partake in the 
wealth created. lt also aims at ensuring that all Ghanaians irrespective of their 
socio-economie status or where they reside have access to basic social services 
such as health care, quality education, potable drinking water, decent housing, 
security from crime and violence, and the ability to participate in decisions that 
affect their own lives123• 
In this sense, the government has recognized the new development paradigm, 
based on broad participation of stakeholders. Improved governance is therefore 
one of the pillars of the strategy. Among the different measures proposed, the 
Government is willing to ensure effective implementation of poverty reduction 
programmes, in order to establish and strengthen the leadership and oversight 
functions ofthe Executive and Parliament. Communication between civil society, 
122 Govemment OfGhana: Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, Voi. I, February 19, 
Accra, 2003. 
123 Govemment OfGhana, 2003 op. cit. 
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traditional authority and all branches of govemment will be institutionalised as a 
means of strengthening public policy management124• 
A major objective in the near Ghanaian future is therefore to improve 
participation in govemance, from protection of their civil liberties, from the 
pursuit of freedom and justice under the banner of the rule of law125• In this sense, 
the govemment has recognized the need to broaden the decentralization agenda in 
line with the so called Ghana Vision 2020. This documents, which sets the year 
2020 as the target for achieving the middle income country status, highlights 
programs and projects, which span on the five prioritized thematic areas: 
infrastructure development and modemized agriculture based on rural 
development to ensure increased production and employment; investments in 
education, health, and sanitation to enhance delivery of basic social services; 
upholding the rule of law, respect for human rights and the attainment of social 
justice and equity to enhance good govemance; and private sector development 
through macro-economie stability and streamlining of public bureaucracy126• 
The documents also put an emphasis on two key elements for decentralizayion: 
the need to advance with the new locai govemment system and the role of the 
private sector. On the first point, there is a clear drive towards developing a 
specific vision on decentralization, redefining responsibilities and mission, 
124 Idem. 
125 Idem. 
126 
Boakye- Boateng: Advancing The Decentralization process, Strategie Pian/or Restructuring 
the Public Administration System, Final Report, Accra, 1997. 
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ensuring transfer of means to the locai level to facilitate the implementation of 
development programs initiated by the locai population. The need for a fiscal 
transfer regulations calls for the necessity of a financial and accountability 
monitoring system to be introduced for effective expenditure control 127• 
On the other hand the vision 2020, as well as the Ghana Poverty Reduction 
Strategy, recognizes the private sector as engine of growth, consequently the 
formation of an enabling environment is one main point on the agenda. It> deals 
with policies conceming the legai ad administrative framework under which the 
public sector operates. It calls for measures that will radically restructure the 
entire Public Administration system to take the role of a facilitator of the private 
sector, rather than regulator128· 
127 
Boakye- Boateng: 1997, Op. Cit 
128 Idem. 
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3.3. History of decentralization in Ghana 
Decentralization and locai govemment in Ghana as a policy has a long history in 
Ghana, which can be divided in three main phases: (i) the colonial period, (ii) the 
post-independence period and (iii) later developments, which became after the 
1988 reforms 
3.3.1. The Colonia) administration 
Decentralization dates back to 1878, when the British colonial administration of 
the introduced the "Indirect Rule" to territory of the then-called Gold Coast. This 
rule was aimed at granting a statutory basis for chiefs to carry out some locai 
govemment functions and act as an means to ensure the application of the 
decisions by the British Govemment Agents and Provincial Commissioner. Por 
these reasons, the British Government established the so-called Native Authorities 
(or chiefdoms), which performed judicial functions, such as trying cases of Iand 
disputes within their area of jurisdiction, as well as operating as government units 
and given authority to pass bye-Iaws on locai matters and raise their own funds. 
A picture d'époque follows. 
This system of indirect rule granted stability and endurance of locai govemment, 
but did not provide an opportunity to improve locai democracy and 
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accountability, as it relied on paramount chiefs, sub-chiefs and elders, often 
behaving like an enlightened oligarch129• These native authorities were not indeed 
democratic, although somehow representatives, as they were hand-picked130• 
However, in the late 1940's and early 1950's the policy of indirect rule was 
modified, based on the recommendations of the Watson Commission in 1948, the 
Coussey Committee in 1949 and later by the Greenwood Commission in 1956 to 
design a more effective locai govemment system131 • 
These reforms succeeded in (i) allowing educated, professional and technical 
persons from the locai areas to be participate to locai councils, (ii) balancing the 
power of the chiefs with that of the elected representatives, thereby enabling the 
locai councils to be constituted of two-thirds elected representatives and one-third 
appointed chiefs; (iii) making the paramount chiefs presidents of the locai 
councils; and (iv) to re-demarcate the areas of jurisdiction on the basis of 
population and its capacity to raise revenues and being economically viable132• 
Despite the above progresses, the decentralized bodies during the colonia! system 
still lacked professional staff and were unable to raise adequate funds to both meet 
129 Ayee, J.: Decentra/ization and Good Governance in Ghana, A Study Prepared for the Canadian 
High Commission, Accra, May 2000, (p. 48). 
130 
MLGRD:Ghana - The New Locai Government System, Ministry of Local Govemment and 
Rural Development, Accra, November 1996, (p.1 ). 
131 Ayee, J.: 2000, Op. Cit. (p. 48). 
132 MLGRD: Issue Paper on Decentralisation in Ghana, Network ofSectoral Co-ordinating Group 
on Decentralisation in Ghana, Ministry of Locai Govemment and Rural Development, Accra, 
September 1999, (p. 2). 
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with their obligations and becorning a Iure for competent personnel. These 
problems led to creating an unpleasant image for these locai authorities, often 
viewed as inept and incompetent 133• 
3.3.2. Post-independence 
After gaining its independence, the several Ghanaian govemrnents faced the 
challenge of ensuring a strong and self-reliant centrai govemment in the Office of 
the President, and address major govemance challenges at govemment level. The 
compromise chosen by the successive govemments was mainly in decentralising 
authority through the regional devolution and district focused public 
administration. In this new systern, the chiefs lost the role they used to have under 
the "indirect rule", and their involvernent in locai leve I adrninistration practically 
carne to an end. These first reforms resulted into creating a strong centrai 
administration, rnatched by hundreds non-viable and fragrnented urban and locai 
councils, and ineffective district councils 134• 
The post-independence locai govemment systern faced rnany challenges. The dual 
hierarchy system between centrai and locai govemrnent was largely inefficient, as 
centrai agencies often infringed rights and responsibilities of the weaker locai 
133 MLGRD: 1996, Op. Cit. 
134 MLGRD: 1999, Op. Cit. 
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bodies, as areas of responsibilities were not always clearly defined. The country 
also faced resources duplication and weak management of the resources 
respectively allocated to the centrai and locai agencies. In such a context, the 
distinction between centrai and locai govemment "only served to create a poor 
and distorted image of locai govemment as corrupt, inefficient and worthless 
relation" 135• 
Under these premised, further changes were made to the administrative system 
changed again at the end of the 1960's and the early 1970's, when a four-tier 
structure was launched. This structure was made up of Regional, District and 
Locai Councils, as well as Town and Village Development Committees. The main 
focus of this system was the District Councils ( 40 of them), with had 
administrative and executive powers for locai level development and 
govemance 136. With the district councils at the core of the system, the locai 
govemment structure could be described as a "Single Hierarchy Model 137", where 
the overall responsibility at locai level, as well as the implementation of 
development activities was left to the Locai Councils. These councils had two-
thirds elected members and one-third appointed chiefs, and worked together with 
about 3960 Town and Village Development Committees to implement 
development activities 138. 
135 MLGRD: 1996, Op. Cit. (p. 3). 
136 MLGRD: Decentralisation, Comprehensive Development Framework, Ministry of Locai 
Govemment and Rural Development, Accra, November 1999. 
137 MLGRD: 1996, Op. Cit. (p. 4). 
138 MLGRD: 1999, Op. Cit. 
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Though well-intentioned, this system did not work properly for a variety of 
reasons. Among them, the MLGRD enlists (i) the poor electoral accountability 
and legitimacy of the politica! authorities at district level, (ii) the excessive 
bureaucratic burden and road blocks generate by the regions, (iii) the lack of 
transfer of adequate competence and means, that could match adequately the 
assignment of new functions, as well as (iv) moves to re-centralize some functions 
with negative impact on the overall management139• These shortcomings clearly 
paved the ground for a rethinking if the decentralization and a major reform in 
1988, when the GoG tried to combine the best of the two previous models of dual 
and single hierarchy140 • 
3.3.3. 1988 breakthrough and the following reforms 
1998 was a crucial year in the decentralization process. The drive for reforms 
mostly carne after the second coup by Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings and the 
establishment of a new military govemment known as the Provisional National 
139 
MLGRD: 1996, Op. Cit. One example is the centralization of the responsibility for the payment 
of district employees to the centra} govemment. This led to a race for recruitment at local level, 
where many unemployed relatives and friends of councilors managed to find ajob under the 
payroll ofthe District Councils, leading to inefficiencies and braking down on fiscal discipline. 
140Idem. 
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Defense Council (PNDC). Rawlings carne to power claiming to build a new 
Ghana, politically from the grassroots up to the centrai govemment141 • 
The review and the revitalization of the decentralization process was therefore a 
result of this inspiration. In 1988, the GoG enacted the Locai Govemment Law, 
1988 (PNDC Law 207), based on a study commissioned the year earlier on 
District Politica! Authority and Modalities for District Level Elections. The 
results of this study were compiled into a "Blue Book", which was later used as 
the basis for discussions with various sections of the population on the key 
features of decentralization. One of these main features was the need to promote 
popular participation and ownership of the govemment apparatus, shifting the 
process of govemance from command to consultative processes, and by devolving 
competence and resources to the district level. The initial implementation 
arrangements requested all Ministries, Departments and Agencies to decentralize 
their activities and operations under the supervision of a high-capacity 
Decentralisation Oversight Committee, which was placed under the office of the 
PNDC Member and Chairman of the Committee of Secretaries (Cabinet), which 
meant basically placing it under the Prime Minister. A few years later, the Civil 
Service Law (PNDC Law 327) designated the Ministry of Locai Government and 
141 
Clarke, V.: "Locai Politics in Ghana: Development, Democracy and Decentralization", Illinois 
Politica/ Science Review, Voi. 7, Number I, Springfield, 2001. 
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Rural Development as the secretariat for overseeing the implementation and 
monitoring of the decentralisation process 142• 
One of the key changes brought by these reforms was the introduction of Ghana's 
District Assemblies, whose members were, at least for 2/3 of their composition, 
elected by the citizen 143• As Crook points out, these have been at first fairly 
successful in facilitating electoral participation and gave access and representation 
to normally excluded groups 144• When the country was later transformed in a 
more conventional, representative multi-party democracy in 1992, the DAs 
became part of the 1992 Constitution of the Forth Republic, and were later 
strengthened by the new legislation and extra funding coming from the District 
Assemblies Common Fund in 1993. Crook and Sverisson view this reform as "an 
attempt to create a rural power base for Rawlings, embodying as it did a 
privileged position for pro-Rawlings revolutionary organizations (which later 
became the core of his party, the NDC), and mechanisms for coopting rural 
business, professional and agrarian elites."145• 
142 MLGRD: 1999, Op. Cit. 
143 It is interesting to note that free elections were allowed at the locai level in 1988, while 
nationally Ghana was stili ruled by a military govemment. Electoral ~emocracy did not come 
until 1992, after growing pressure from Ghana' s urban elite and international development 
agencies. However, after the results of the 1992 presidential election were announced, with Flt. 
Lt. Jerry John Rawlings becoming President Rawlings and a reincarnation ofthe military-backed 
PNDC, parliamentary elections were boycotted by opposition parties. It was only after the 1996 
presidential and parliamentary elections that the opposition captured nearly one-third ofthe seats 
in the National Assembly, and the elections were deemed free and fair by intemational observers. 
144 Crook, R.: "Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: The Politics of Locai-Centrai 
Relations", Public Administration and Development, voi. 23, 2003, (p.77-88). 
145 Crook, R. and A. Sverisson: 2001, Op. Cit. (p 30) 
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When Ghana's regime finally changed from authoritarianism back to democratic 
mie the decentralization structures created by the PNDC were not altered under 
the Fourth Republic 146, and the govemment focused on the severa! 
implementation challenges. 
3.4. The current locai government structure 
The decentralization structure in Ghana has been defined by Ayee and Tay, as a 
"mixed" or "fused" type of decentralized authority, where those institutions 
extending from the centrai govemment ( such as the District Chief Executive 
(DCE) and deconcentrated departments and organizations) and locally based 
institutions like the Di stri et Assembli es (DAs) are linked into one single 
organizational structure at the locai level. The system is in fact designed to put an 
end to the distinction between "locai govemment" and centrai govemment field 
agencies147• 
The District Assemblies are therefore in charge of (i) the overall development of 
the districts, (ii) the formulation of strategies for the resource mobilization and 
(iii) the provision of basic infrastructure and municipal works and services. They 
146
The fact that key figures ofthe PNDC era (most notably President Rawlings) remained in power 
and won the first two elections clearly helped maintain the structure intact. 
147 
Ayee, J. and F. Tay: "A Decade ofDecentralization Reforms in Ghana, 1988-1998", 
Scandinavian Seminar College: African Perspectives on Policies and Practices Supporting 
Sustainable Development, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire on November 9-11, 1998. 
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are 11 O, although three of them are Metropolitan Assembli es (for the district with 
population exceeding 250,000 such as Accra, Kumasi and Shama Ahanta) and 
three are Municipal Assemblies (with populatian aver 95,000). Therefore only 
103 can be defined strictu sensu as District Assemblies (with papulatian af 75,000 
and aver). 
The campasition af the DAs is made up of about 2/3 cent elected representatives, 
1/3 percent appointed by the President in consultation with the traditianal 
authorities and interest groups, as well the Members of Parliament whose 
constituencies fall within the area of authority of the DA (althaugh they are not 
voting members), and the District Chief Executives (DCE). This latter is the chief 
representative of the centrai gavemment in the district and is probably the mast 
important and powerful figure of the district administration. The DCE is basically 
in charge afthe day-to-day performance afthe DA functions148• 
DAs are camplemented by the Executive Committee (EXECO), which is made up 
of one-third of the members af the DA and performs the executive and 
administrative functions of the DA, namely it implements its resolutions, oversees 
the district administration, caordinates plans and programs of its sub-commitees 
and develops and executes approved plans ofthe sub-district structures149• 
148 Idem 
149 
Ayee, J.: 2000, Op. Cit. (p. 22). 
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As displayed in the following chart, with the exception of the Metropolitan 
Assemblies which bave an additional layer, DAs are generally part of a three tier 
structure, by falling under the responsibility of the Regional Coordinating 
Councils (RCC) and by associating with sub-district structures150. 
150 Ibidem: p. 15-I 7 
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Figure 7 Ghana Locai Government Structure 
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Source: MLGRD, Status of Decentralisation lmplementation, Ministry of Locai Govemment 
and Rural Development, Accra, January 2002. 
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The I O Regional Coordinating Councils are in charge of regulating and 
coordinating the DAs in the respecting regions of the country. Being made of the 
Regional Minister ( an appointee of the centrai govemment as well as its 
representative in the region as a chairman), his deputy, two representatives of the 
Regional House of Chiefs, the DCEs of the districts and the presiding members of 
the DAs in the region, the RCC also monitor the use of resources allocated to the 
DAs by any agency. They report directly to the Office of the President and liaise 
with the National Development Planning Committee and the Locai Govemment 
Secretariat ofthe MLGRD. 
The sub-district structures are: (i) the sub-metropolitan district councils, which act 
as an additional body to support the planning and management of the three largest 
metropolies (ii) the Urban, Zonal and Town/ Area Councils, which support some 
part of the administration, the enforcement and mobilization of the DAs, and 
finally (iii) the Unit Committees, which are elective bodies and perform functions 
such as the registration of births and deaths, fundraising initiatives and public 
education campaigns151 • 
3.5. Assessing the experience of the decentralization in Ghana 
151 Ayee, J.: 2000, Op. Cit. (p. 17-18). 
Decentralization and Governance in Developing Countries: The Case of Ghana 80 
"There are no universally agreed criteria for assessmg the quality of 
decentralization"152• Tue existing literature on decentralization in developing 
countries has given wide contributions to the analysis of this process by looking 
into the impact of decentralization on a variety of factors related to development 
153 or by presenting stories of success or failure of the overall process or one 
specific element154 or area of the world 155 • The experience ofthe decentralization 
in Ghana has been studied by many authors156• These analyses have often focused 
on institutional, economie, cultural and political aspects of this process. The 
following is an attempt to analyze the Ghanaian experience, by borrowing some 
govemance concepts and while keeping the geographical aspect into stem 
consideration. There is clearly index, which can conceptually capture all aspects 
of the govemance of decentralization process. However, a focus on key 
observable aspects of the govemance dimensions, based on the W orld Bank 
lnstitute methodology described above, can be helpful in assessing the success or 
152 Ayee,J.: 2000, Op. Cit. (p. 27). 
153 
Chema, G.and D. Rondinelli, (eds.): Decentralization and Development, Beverly Hi1ls, Sage 
1983; Manor, J .: 1995, Op. Cit.; Prud'homme, R.: 1995, Op. Cit.; Jacob,J-P: 1998, Op. Cit. ; 
Bardhan, P .: "Decentralization of Governance and Development", Journal of Economie 
Perspective, Volume 16, Number 4, Harverd (univ. Press), 2002, (p. 185-205); Barhan, P. and D. 
Mookherjee: 2003,0p. Cit. etc. 
154 
Bardhan, P. and D. Mookherjee: 1998, Op. Cit.; Blair, H.: "Participation and Accountability at 
the Periphery: Democratic Locai Governance in Six Countries", World Development, Voi. 28, No. 
1, 2000, (p. 21-39), etc ... 
155 
Oluwu, D.: 1998, Op. Cit.; Wunsch, J. and D. Olowu: 1990, Op.Cit.; Davis, D. et Al.: 
"Decentralization by Default: Locai Governance and the View from the Village in The Gambia", 
Public Administration and Development, Voi 14, 1994 (p. 253-269); Milanzi, M.: "La 
Gouvernance en Milieu Rural: le Cas de la Tanzanie", Revuefrançaise d'administration publique, 
n. 88, octobre-décembre, ENA Paris 1998, (p. 603-610); Hope, K.R.: 2000, Op.Cit.; etc ... 
156 Ayee, J.: 2000, Op.Cit.; Thomi, W. et al. (eds): "A Decade ofDecentralisation and Locai 
Government Reform in Ghana: Retrospect and Prospects", EPAD Research Project I Ministry of 
locai Government and Rural Development, Gold-Type Ltd, Accra 2000, etc. 
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failure of the decentralization in the country157• The key aspects of the govemance 
dimension considered in this work are: (i) information and communication (ii) 
citizen voice and accountability; (iii) accountability, and finally (iv) govemment 
orientation and responsiveness to the locai needs 
3 .5 .1. Information and Communication 
As mentioned in the first chapter, adeguate information and communication is a 
key element for any reform, as well as a prerequisite for empowerment and 
meaningful participation. This can be assessed by listening to stakeholders' own 
knowledge, attitudes and perceptions about the reform. The EP AD (Endogenous 
Potentials and Decentralisation) 158 project and particularly its survey on people's 
perception of the district assemblies and the decentralization as a whole is a key 
reference in this regard. 
157 Kaufmann, et al., 1999, 
158 
The EPAD Project was a research project by the University of Ghana, Department of 
Geography and Reso uree DeveloJ' ment and the University of Manheim, Department of Economie 
Geography in occasi on of the l O anniversary of the launching of the 1998 reform in order to 
evaluate the decentralization by looking at stakeholders opinions, perceptions and attitudes 
towards it. A study was carri ed out in a sample of 8 districts, which has been chosen based on 
some key criteria ofrepresentation in terms ofphysical, demographic, economie and 
administrative characteristics. Thomi, W. et al. (eds): 2000,0p. Cit., summarize the results ofthis 
study. 
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The survey reveals a fascinating universe of different views among the Ghanaian 
population about the District Assemblies and their functions. The concept of 
"District" is mostly associated to the idea of "administrative area" (90.9 percent of 
the respondents). This perception is predominant with teachers, students and 
contractors and is positively correlated to formai education. The District is also 
strongly associated to the idea of "area designed for development" (95.4%). 
Conversely, the view of the district as a "political area" is less common (65.5%) 
and mostly supported by farmers (68.6%), workers (65.5%) and traders (65.6%), 
and to a lesser extent by civil servants and students, displaying a negative 
correlation with level of education. Similar trend can be found with the idea of 
District as a "traditional area" (53%), which is predominant among farmers 
(58.8%)159. 
Different views bave also been expressed in terms of the function of the DAs. 
About half of the sample population converges towards the idea that the primary 
function of the District is the "provision of service infrastructure" (such as water 
and sanitation, electricity, health, education and transport facilities), whereas 
about one quarter picked the "generai development function". Only 14.8 percent 
of the respondents selected other economie functions. Little support is left to the 
other functions, such as the politica! ones160• In conclusion, the survey reveals a 
159 Thomi et al., (eds): 2000, Op. Cit. (p. 92- 93). 
160 Ibidem: p. 93 - 95. 
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fairly good understanding of the stated objectives of the DA, except for serving as 
a space for political debate and mobilization. 
One further element of interest for public communication efforts is the public 
support to the DAs. According to the EPAD survey, although the judgment on the 
performance of the DAs is mixed, almost 7 4 percent of the surveyed population 
has still a positive perception of the District Assemblies. The study also reveals 
that the negative perception is more present among urban areas, where the rural 
people tend to view the DA more favorably 161 • The same study reveals that public 
support is also an area where improvement is needed. More than a quarter of the 
population view public support for DAs and involvement of communities as the 
single most important element needed to improve their performance162• 
In terms of communication, one of the largest areas of concem is the expectation 
gap between the promises that the decentralization reform brought forward and 
the reality of their delivery. This phenomenon is present is many decentralization 
cases in the developing countries and has assumed a special dimension in Ghana. 
As mentioned above, the judgment on the DAs is fairly mixed with about half of 
the respondents having a positive view on their performance in term of 
administrative, developmental and locai resource mobilization functions, and the 
other half having a negative judgment on the same categories. The respondents 
161 Ibidem: p 86-87. 
162 lb·d o 1 em: p. IO - 101 
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tend to converge towards a negative assessment of the DAs capacity to mobilize 
extemal resources (63.8%). When asked on the greatest achievement of the DAs, 
the overall majority focuses on infrastructure (81.3%)163 • Some concem can be 
raised when matching this data with the one on the main function of the DAs, 
which assigned a certain importance to other functions as well. 
Finally, access to timely, well targeted and comprehensible information is one 
further key aspect and a prerequisite for active participation. The Ghana GPRS 
highlights this as one important aspect needing improvement. In fact, according to 
the govemment strategy, "pub li e should have ready access to the budget, the 
pattern of expenditure and progress made in the implementation of ali projects in 
the District whether funded by the Assembly, govemment or NGOs. This 
information should be provided in a form understandable to the less educated"164· 
3.5.2. Voice and representation 
One of the key expected benefits of decentralization reforms in terms of 
govemance was to provide citizens with more opportunities to express their 
163 Ibidem: p 98 - 99 
164 
Govemment of Ghana: Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, Voi. 1, February 19, 
Accra, 2003. 
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voices and participate more actively into the decision making on the locai matters. 
In 1989, the military rules identified the District Assemblies as the key "political 
space" for this participation to happen. As previously mentioned, these reforms 
have been initially quite successful in enhancing electoral participation and giving 
access and representation to traditionally excluded groups, such as the 
uneducated, farmers, traders and artisans. However, the social composition of 
elected assemblies remained markedly dualistic, with unsurprising over-
representation of the well educated, but nonetheless substantial representation of 
less privileged groups. The elite character of the Assemblies was also largely a 
consequence of the government selection of one-third of their members 165• 
DA's role as a means to express voice and have proper representation has also 
shown a decline over time, as expressed by the tumout of the elections that have 
taken piace in the country. -While the first elections in 1989 shown a great 
enthusiasm with a 58 percent of eligible votes, the turnout declines dramatically in 
1994 to a low 29 percent, climbing back to 39 .5 percent in 1998. Crook and 
Sverisson argue that even this later increase does not reflect an enhanced support 
to the DA, but it is rather a result of a higher registered electorate166• 
165 Crook, R.: 2004, Op. Cit. 
166 Crook,R. and A. Sverisson: 2001, Op. Cit. 
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3.5.3. Participation 
When the decentralization reform was launched in 1989, it was presented as a 
fulfillment of the commitment of the "Rawlings Revolution" to introduce a ''truly 
Ghanaian" form of grass-root democracy167• The village level Unit Committees 
were planned to be one of the key instruments for participation in this sense. They 
were indeed one of the milestones of Rawlings "revolutionary structure" and they 
originally ensured a broad participation of stakeholders at locai level, including 
those groups which are generally marginalized by the politica! process. It is worth 
noting that women' s participation at the village-level bodies was better than or 
nearly as good as that ofmen, particularly in southem Ghana168• 
"At the leve! of direct participation in village-level bodies that the Assembly 
system fai led to li ve up to the expectations Ioaded on it by the govemment' s 
populist, radical aspirations"169• In fact, notwithstanding the Unit Committees 
carne to a close, at least officially, with the revolutionary organs of the former 
military govemment in 1992, delays and the domination by the NDC prevented 
them from functioning as intended170• When the Unit Committees finally held 
their first popular election in 1998 (well nine years after the establishment of the 
DAs ), 65 percent of the elections were uncontested, reflecting both apathy and 
167 Idem, (p. 30) 
168 Idem. The authors also note that this point shall not be considered necessarily as a "victory of 
the poor and deprived", as the women in those regions tended to be younger and well-educated 
169 Idem. 
170 Idem. 
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alienation caused by divergences, intimidation of contenders and administrative 
chaos 171 • 
The one area of locai politics cited by Crook and Sverisson (2001) as successful 
in terms of direct participation is the "self-help"172 community development 
associations. These associations are supposed to benefit from the animating and 
facilitating role of Assembly representatives. 
However, as Crook and Manor found in their survey, the presence of the DA has 
not always been an asset for the association, as assembly representatives often 
find themselves in contradiction between their role in the community self-help 
activities and the one as DA members 173• "The more successful the self-help 
projects of the community association, the less willing locai constituents are to 
pay Assembly taxes or accord any legitimacy or usefulness to its activities"174• 
One common complaint also comes from the fact that many unfinished self-help 
projects are those where matching help was promised by the DA, but never 
granted175• 
171 Crook, R.: 1999, Op. Cit. 
172"Self-help" can be defined as a community-based form of self-reliant economie and social 
development (Crook, R. and A. Sverisson: 2001, Op. Cit.) or a sort oflocal expression ofthe 
previously defined Community-Driven Development (CDD) concept. 
173 
Crook, R. and J. Manor: Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: 
Participation, Accountability and Peiformance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
174 Crook, R. and A. Sverisson: 2001, Op Cit, (p 32). 
175 Crook, R. and J. Manor: 1998, Op. Cit. 
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As argued by Crook, "the richness of evidence available on the lack of 
responsiveness of the Ghanaian system demonstrates clearly the need to go 
beyond increasing participation for its own sake to making participation 
effective176• Yet by comparison with other African countries, Ghana's Assemblies 
look relatively good in terms of participatory achievements"177• One of the key 
questions is now to see to which extent this increased participation led to a higher 
responsiveness by both the locai and centrai govemment to the locai needs. 
3.5.4. Government responsiveness to locai needs 
Several authors have conducted research in different parts of the country to assess 
the govemment responsiveness to locai needs as a consequence of the 
decentralization process. A first good indicator in this senses its possible 
contributi on in terms of inequality across the regi on 178• This is particularly true if 
we consider that regional inequality is one of the prime motives for 
decentralization. In Clarke's study179 on the three Northem regions (which are 
also the poorest one) presents a fairly positive view of the decentralization process 
in reducing inequalities and addressing the needs of the poorest areas of the 
country. First, Clark observes an increase in total development spending in the 
176 Crook, R.: 2004, Op. Cit (p.5). 
177 Ibidem: p. 32 
178 Idem; Clarke, V.: 2002, Op. Cit; Asante, F and J. Ayee: 2004, Op. Cit.; etc 
179 Clarke, V.: 2002, Op. Cit. 
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above regions, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of total spending. 
Clarke also notes that, "while there were constraints on district spending, with 
some centrai govemment transfers being earmarked for certain expenditures, 
districts did see increases in development spending for education, health, water 
and sanitation, and other priority services. The result has been a clear and 
undeniable increase in development projects and services since the late l 980s 
across the Northem regions. There are clinics, roads and boreholes in the districts 
where there used to be none180". 
This picture is somehow confirmed by Crook' s study on decentralization, where 
total development expenditure and development spending as a percentage of total 
spending increased after decentralization181 • Asante and Ayee reach a similar 
conclusion. As displayed in the following figure, capitai expenditure over time 
has overridden recurrent expenditure 182• 
180 Idem. 
181 Crooks, R.: 1994, Op. Cit. 
182 Asante, F and J. Ayee: 2004, Op. Cit. 
Decentralization and Governance in Developing Countries: The Case of Ghana 90 
Figure 8 Composition of Total Expenditure at the District Level, 1994 -1999 
Source: Asante, F and J. Ayee: 2004, Op. Cit. 
In particular, the regional breakdown of locai govemment expenditure presented 
by Asante and Ayee shows that the poorest regions tend to bave a higher rate of 
capitai expenditures, relative those on recurrent items183 • For instance, as 
183 Idem. 
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presented in the following table on the 1999 budget, the Upper West Region, one 
of the poorest one in the country, spent 77.2 percent of the locai govemment 
expenditure on capitai expenditure and only 22.8 percent on recurrent 
expenditure, whereas the Greater Accra, the richest region, spent only 44.0 
percent of their locai government expenditure on capitai items and 56.0 percent on 
recurrent items. 
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Table 2 Regional Expenditure Performance in 1999 (in million cedis) 
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Asante and Ayee also confirm that the improved infrastructure development has 
been significant and has removed some of the barriers to an enhanced social and 
economie development184• However, the same authors also point out that 
complaints have been raised by some rural people that most of these services and 
infrastructure have been concentrated mainly in the district capitals to the 
detriment of the rural areas. 
On the issue of whether these encouraging results were in line with the needs 
expressed by the population, Crook185 points out that locai development priorities 
of voters were mostly reflected in the education and sanitation spending, but, on 
the other band, other popular preferences, such as the provision of health 
facilities, electricity and water, were taken in a lesser account in district budgets. 
In their survey on two districts, Crook and Manor found that 70 percent of the 
respondents believed that the DA did not respond to their needs 186• 
Crook and Sverisson explain this result by pointing out that the DA' s actions, 
"tended to reflect either govemment pressure to mobiles locai revenue sources, 
leading to expenditures on commerciai transport services, farming or 
manufacturing enterprises and markets; or they reflected centrally determined 
184Idem. 
It is worth pointing out that this statement is confirmed by the author own observation upon his 
fil ed trip to the Northem regions. Compared to other African rural areas, but al so to those of other 
developing countries in other continents, the quality ofthe (at least) main roads in Northem Ghana 
is definitively noticeable. 
185 Crook, R.: 1994, Op. Cit. 
186 
Crook, R. and J. Manor: 1998, Op. Cit. 
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programs and priorities, the costs of which had been pushed down onto the 
Districts"187. One of the examples cited by Crook and Sverisson are the national 
education reform which required the building of Junior Secondary Schools across 
the country188• 
3.5.5. Accountability 
Accountability189 is a crucial element of a well functioning institution. Manor 
defines two types of accountability: the one of bureaucrats towards elected 
members and the one of councilors towards their citizens 190• Khemani argues that 
decentralization tends to increase govemment accountability through greater voter 
vigilance in more locai elections, as proved in his analysis of the elections in India 
at locai vs centrai level 191 • However, many studies on the decentralization in 
Ghana lead us to conclude that both these types of accountability are fairly week 
in the country. The first reason is historical and is linked to the political rational 
behind the third wave of decentralization reform in the country and the 1988 law. 
As we mentioned earlier, the military regime of Jerry Rawlings initially set out on a 
'revolutionary' path, although it lacked a mass political party comparable to those of 
187 
Crook, R. and A. Sverisson: 2001 Op Cit. (p. 32). 
188 Idem. 
189 Accountability can be defined as "the ability to cali public officials, private employers, or 
service providers to account, requiring that they be answerable for their poli ci es, actions, and use 
offunds". World Bank, 2002, Empowerment and Poverty Reduction Sourcebook (p. 16) 
190 Manor, J.: 1995, Op. Cit. 
191 Khemani, S.: 2000, Op. Cit. 
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other revolutionary movements elsewhere. As Crooks points out "the late l 980s, 
these revolutionary organizations were little more than 'Rawlings loyalists' and once 
they were converted into a conventional political party after 1992, they continued to 
be part of a centrally controlled power and patronage system, using District 
Assemblies to co-opt locai elites where possible, and exclude opposition elites where 
necessary" 192• 
An other good indicators of the poor accountability of the decentralized system is 
given by the finding of the EP AD research, which depicts a fairly negative view 
of the Ghanaian population ofthe capacity of the District Assembly to take 
decisions autonomously. According to the survey, 44.4% ofthe respondents 
declared that "the District Assembly cannot take decisions and is controlled by the 
administration". If we add the 24.3 % of indifferent opinions, we are left out with 
a minority of only 30%, who believes in the independence of the assembli es from 
the centrai administration 193• This criticai view is particularly strong among the 
population with higher level of education and with the urban population. The 
findings by EP AD lead us to the conclusion that "the people in the periphery and 
specifically the farmers did not see this type of problems as very common 
whereas this perception seems to be more present in the District Capitals. Up to a 
certain level, this concentration of criticai views in the District Capitals - the 
study argues - is obviously related to the availability of information on the 
192 Coork, R.: 2004, Op. Cit. (p. 12). 
193 
Thomi, W. et al.: 2000, Op.Cit. (p. 102-103). 
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topic" 194• Partly as a result of this poor accountability, the district and municipal 
assemblies have been found to be viewed among the "least honest" organizations 
in a country-wide study on governance and corruption conducted by the Center 
for Democracy and Development and commissioned by the World Bank 195 
Crook and Sverisson present a variety of explanations why the decentralization 
was not translated into better accountability. First, the authors blame the military 
regime and its successor for their reluctance to surrender their close political 
control over the Assemblies, as well as its related patronage196• This control was 
kept for instance by securing the appointment of government loyalists as District 
Chief Executives or though the former "revolutionary organs" some of which 
transformed into NGOs, which still occupy a privileged piace in locai politics. 
Second set of reasons are to be found in some institutional factors that limited the 
accountability of government-appointed officials and civil servants to the DA. For 
instance, the Presiding Member of the Assembli es had in fact no major executive 
powers and was even excluded from the Executive Committee. Furthermore the 
Assemblies lacked a strong legai and politica} capacity to retain control over the 
deconcentrated Ministries and locai field agencies, and therefore did not manage 
to transiate locai public demands into actions in the areas of roads, water supplies_ 
or electricity. Finally, the "no-party" rule on the DA elections limited the 
194 Idem. 
195 CDD, "The Ghana Governance and Corruption Survey Evidence from Households, Enterprises 
and Public Officials ", August 2000 
196Crook, R. and A. Sverisson: 2001, Op. Cit. 
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emergence of an officiai opposition and the public monitoring of the program by 
the Assemblies. The lack of party affiliation led to a context where "the 
representatives are all "delegates" of their own communities, dedicated to 
pursuing that particular interest, and therefore reluctant to accept the legitimacy of 
any generai allocative decision"197• 
197 Idem. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Many developing countries are experiencing what we may cali the "end of the 
Leviathan": the shift from a model of state similar to the one theorized by Hobbes, 
where the centrai government is absolutely supreme and nothing is thought to be 
independent of the centrai government198, to a state which tries to adapt and be 
more responsive to the locai needs. One of the most "fashionable" strategies 
adopted nowadays to reach this goal, as argued by this work, is the setting up of 
decentralization processes. 
Much of the decentralization which has taken piace in the past decades has been 
motivated not only by economie concerns, but also, and in many cases 
predominantly, by politica! ones. As presented in this work, this is particularly 
true in the African continent during the 90s, the period Oluwu defines as the third 
wave of decentralization 199• This phase is characterized by the spread of multi-
party politica} systems, that create the demand for a more locai voice in the 
decision making process. In other words, decentralization has often been used as a 
response to demands for democracy and better governance. These concerns are 
198 
Hobbes,T, Leviathan, Penguin Classics, London, 1951 
199 Oluwu, D.: 1998, Op. Cit. 
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not only among the underlying factors in the drive towards decentralization, but 
also lie at the core of the explanations for its failure in most African countries, 
where decentralization has suffered from poor public support, under-
representation of disadvantaged groups, low accountability and elite capture; 
therefore breaking its promise of better democracy and more equitable 
development. One of the first findings of this work is, in fact, that decentralization 
is not a panacea and most of the problems of effective decentralization are often 
neither technical nor economical, but rather linked to govemance factors. This is 
true particularly in Africa. 
The experience of Ghana is somehow a blueprint of the above mentioned drive for 
decentralization as a democratization tool, but it is also an example of both 
success and failure in the attainment of its expected outcomes. One of the first 
tentative conclusions we can draw is that the decentralization was a key step 
toward the democratization process and has somewhat contributed to address 
spatial inequity. On the earlier point, this work points out that the 1989 District 
elections, the first ones in decades of coups and military regimes, set the stage for 
a retum to democracy and the 1992 National elections. Using the words of 
Owusu, the District Assemblies in particular "had the salutary effect of increasing 
locai autonomy and raising political consciousness and participation, notably by 
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producing both elected and appointed members who are more representative of, 
and responsive to, the locai electorate"200• 
The DA and the sub-district structures have definitively broadened the political 
spectrum to previously disenfranchised groups such as farmers and women. 
However, this process has not been as successful as most had hoped. A more 
attentive analysis reveals that, although the knowledge and the public support of 
the DAs is comparatively much higher levels than in many other African 
countries, the perception of the DA as a space for political debate and 
mobilization is still very low. Moreover, there is a need to reinforce the 
information available and public understanding about the DAs and better manage 
expectations on their capacity to deliver services. It is also criticai to broaden the 
efforts to build support to the DA as an institution, both at the grassroots level, but 
also at the level of policymakers in the centrai government, which are often 
reluctant in delegating responsibilities and resources to the DAs. 
Regarding the DA's role as a means to express citizens' voice and have proper 
democratic representation, a remarkable progress has been achieved, especially if 
compared with other African decentralization processes. This success, however, 
has declined over time. Moreover, at the level of direct participation in village-
level bodies, the system failed to live up to the expectations loaded on it by the 
200 Owusu, M.: "Democracy and Africa - a View from the Village", The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 30(3), 1992, (p.369-396). 
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govemment initial populist and radical aspirations201 • The most successful actions 
in this sense bave come from the self-help organizations and the several 
community driven development initiatives in the country. However, as pointed 
out in this work, there is a clear need to strengthen the link between these 
initiatives and the decentralized authorities. 
In terms of responsiveness of locai needs, it is quite plausible to argue that 
decentralization has contributed to larger allocati on of funds to the poorest regions 
and, to a certain extent, to a greater spatial equity. Indeed, as illustrated in this 
work, the specific Ghanaian territory, characterized by a dichotomy between 
North and South,( as illustrated by the Annex 2) poses several challenges and 
suggests an higher distribution of resources and investments to the Northem part. 
This is an area that has been disfavored by its geography and too often neglected 
by the colonia! and early post-colonial govemments. It is questionable whether 
these allocations bave been adequate enough to significantly make a real impact, 
and there are several doubts whether they may bave reflected the locai needs and 
demands. 
The weakest point seems to be the accountability mechanisms, which, according 
to the analysis, do not seem to be strong enough to ensure that stakeholders' 
interests are represented effectively and equitably in the policy making process. In 
fact, DAs are still highly dependent from decisions taken by the centrai 
201 Crook,R. and A. Sverisson: 2001, Op. Cit.. 
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govemment, and generally captured by locai elites or specific interest groups. 
This has institutional, political and cultura! explanations. In this sense, one may 
argue that decentralization has not succeeded yet in bringing more accountability 
at the local level, but it has rather shifted the locus of a top-down decision making 
process to the district level, replicating to a certain extent all the inefficiencies and 
patronage which arise from that. In this regard, Ghana is not that diff erent from 
many other political realities that have a shaping influence on the results of 
decentralization policies in Africa. Using Crook's words "any prospect of using 
decentralized govemance to develop more pro-poor policies must depend upon a 
real effort being undertaken to strengthen and broaden accountability 
mechanisms"202• 
Popular perceptions and views of this logie, as well as the consequential loss of 
interest in the locai decision-making process, reinforce this outcome. In arder to 
address this problem, the country would need to make some appropriate 
institutional adjustments, focusing on enhancing the accountability both 
horizontally and vertically, at local and national levels. Moreover, there is also the 
need to create new spaces of communication and dialogue at the local level. These 
would create further opportunities for communities and the more disadvantaged 
groups to express their voice and could liberate them from the dependence on 
locai elites. If the process of communication and dialogue is incorporated into the 
DA' s work and decision-making, it would further contribute to build trust towards 
202 Crooks, R.: 2003, Op. Cit. 
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the DAs themselves and to generate a healthy bottom-up pressure, which is vital 
to a democratic process. 
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Source: World Bank: 2003, Op. Cit. (data are estimates) www.worldbank.org/gh 
* The diamonds show four key indicators in the country (in bold) compared with 
its income-group average. lf data are missing, the diamond will be incomplete. 
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ANNEX 2 THE NORTH-SOUTH DICHOTOMY 
Ghana, like many of its neighbor West African countries on the Gulf of Guinea 
(such as Togo and Benin), face large disparities between its Northern part and the 
South, as well as a development gap. This distinction between the northern 
regions and the rest is fairly large. Many authors therefore treat this spatial 
inequality as a "reversed" North-South phenomenon203• Others depict rather a 
core-periphery structure out ofthe North-South spatial economy2°4• 
Vanderpuye-Orgle, in specific, defines the Ashanti, Eastem and Centrai Regions 
as well as the Western and Brong-Ahafo Regions as the core zone of the 
country205• These regions, which make up the forest ecological zone of the 
country's South, are the prime cocoa, timber and minerai producing areas. The 
coastal areas are also a part of the core as a consequence of the rapid growth in the 
port towns. One other key climatic factor is the certainly the uneven rainfall level, 
which make agricultural production harder in the North206• As opposite to the 
fertile Southern part, in the North it is therefore not rare to encounter a landscape 
and an arid territory. 
203 Songsore, J.: 1989, Op. Cit. 
204 Vanderpuye-Orgle, J.: 2004, Op. Cit. 
205Idem. 
206 EIU: Ghana Country Report 2004, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 2004. 
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According to the country and the WB documents, overall poverty levels decreased 
between 1991/92 and 1998/99 from 52% to 40%. Following the sam etrend, 
extreme poverty declined from 37% to 27% over the same period. However, this 
progress masks the uneven decline in poverty of growing and deepening poverty 
in some geographical areas207• 
The evidence suggests that the vulnerability and exclusion among some 
geographical groups, socio-economie groups, gender and age groups may 
bave worsened. Population growth during the period may have far outstripped 
the positive impact of growth on the rate of decline in poverty levels in some 
areas. Furthermore, exept for the migration of the youth from the rural to the 
urban areas as head porters, street sellers and so forth, poverty levels in some of 
these areas could bave been worse than what the statistics reveal. 
There are significant differences in the spatial distribution of poverty. More 
recent datas ( 1999) informed that five, out of ten regions in Ghana, had more than 
40% of their population living in poverty. As shown in the fiure below, if divided 
by income measure, poverty levels are highest in the three northem savannah 
regions (the Upper East, Upper West and Northem Regions), ranging between 
69% and 88%. Nine out often people in the Upper East, eight out of ten in Upper 
West, seven out of ten in Northem Region and five out of ten in Centrai and 
207 Govemment ofGhana: 2003, Op. Cit. 
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Eastern Regions were classified as poor in 1999 (Figure 9). Of the ten regions, 
the Upper East, Northern and Centrai regions experienced increases in poverty 
levels and extreme poverty in the 1990s. Urban areas in the northern savannah 
also experienced significant increases in poverty levels during the period208. 
Figure 9 Regional Poverty Profile 
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According to the literature, the North-South gap is not only a consequence of 
climatic and morphologic conditions ofthe territory, but were a direct result of the 
colonialism, which shaped the internal structure of the country, to fit the needs of 
the colonial metropolis, based on a dynamic modem export sector on the one 
hand, and a "backward", underdeveloped subsistence sector, on the other side. 
208 Idem. 
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The divide produced, has in time continued even after the colonialism, through 
deliberate distortions of the internal patterns of production, as well as through the 
spatial organization of economie and social activity209 
Other author, in more recent articles Vanderpuye-Orgle reasons that, starting from 
the mid-1980s, awareness of the deprived North raised and become a prominent 
political priority. The Government focus shifted to facilitate the development of 
the area. As we will see in the following chapters, this is also the period when the 
decentralization process had one of the most significant momentum210• 
One further aspect of the North-South divide is the distribution of the population 
and the manpower. As displayed in the table below, with the exception of the 
Upper East, the Northern regions have the lowest population density. This divide 
has encouraged migration from the North to the South, causing further disparity in 
terms of population. The population growth rate featured in the outhem regions, 
reaching a maximum annua! growth rate of 4.4 percent in the Greater Accra, can 
be better explained by internal migration flows than by fertility rates, which are 
traditionally larger in the rural areas. 
209 Songsore,J.: 1989, Op.Cit. 
210 Vanderpuye-Orgle,J.: 2004, Op.Cit. 
Decentralization and Governance in Developing Countries: The Case of Ghana 117 
Table 3 Basic Characteristics of the Population in the Regions 
Annual 
Population growth 
Total Rural Urban density rate 
Western 1,924,577 1,226,159 698,418 80.5 3.2 
Centrai 1,593,823 995,418 598,405 162.2 2.1 
Greater 2,905,726 358,042 2,547,684 895.5 4.4 
Accra 
Volta 1,635,421 1, 194,337 441,084 79.5 1.9 
Eastem 2,106,696 1,378,782 727,914 109.0 1.4 
Ashanti 3,612,950 1,759,885 1,853,065 148.1 3.4 
Brong 1,815,408 1,136,628 678,780 45.9 2.5 
Ahafo 
Northem 1,820,806 1,337,016 483,790 25.9 2.8 
Upper East 920,089 775,807 144,282 104.1 1.1 
Upper West 567,583 475,735 100,848 31.2 1.7 
Total 18,903,079 10,637,809 8,274,270 79.3 2.7 
Source: EIU: 2004, Op.Cit. 
Figure 9 provides another perspective of the incidence of poverty for the country 
as a whole and by localities that span different administrative regions. At the 
national level, nearly one-quarter of the population (27%) in 1989-99 was unable 
to meet their basic nutritional requirement even if they devoted their entire 
consumption budget to food. The geographical variations of extreme poverty 
ranged from 2% in Greater Accra to 59% in Rural Savannah, which spans 
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much of the Northem, Upper West and Upper East administrative regions. 
The 1 % increase in extreme poverty between the two census periods in rural 
savannah is in contrast with the no-change in extreme poverty in the urban 
savannah. The increase in overall poverty across these three administrative 
regions is therefore largely a rural phenomenon, a case of the poor getting 
poorer. 
In contrast, reductions in extreme poverty have occurred noticeably in rural forest 
belt and moderately in the rural coastal. Despite these reductions, the levels of 
poverty in Brong Ahafo, Volta, and Eastem regions remain high. The information 
in Figure 3.2 also suggests that apart from Accra average reductions in extreme 
poverty in the urban areas have been minor. 
Figure 10 Extreme poverty incidence by locality 
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Fi ure 11 Ghana, Economie Characteristics b 
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ANNEX 3 IMAGES FROM THE FIELD 
Figure 12 Image of a rural village in the North 
Source: Picture by the author 
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Figure 13 Photo portraying a group of Chiefs of Accra (1909) 
Source: Tamarin Inc: Picture by Daniel LAINÉ 
Figure 14 A community water pump 
Source: Photo by the author 
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Figure 15 A village meeting in the Upper East region 
Source: Picture by the author 
Figure 16 Site of World Bank funded project in the Northern Regions 
Source: Picture by the author 
